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the project on ‘access to 
citizenship and its impact on 
immigrant integration’ (acit)
The research project ‘Access to Citizenship and its Impact on Immigrant Integration (ACIT) 
has compared how European states regulate the acquisition of citizenship and the impact of 
citizenship on the socio-economic and political participation of immigrants. 
All results of the project are accessible on the EUDO CITIZENSHIP observatory at www.
eudo-citizenship.eu. The project was financially supported by the European Fund for the In-
tegration of Non-EU immigrants (European Commission Grant Agreement: HOME/2010/
EIFX/CA/1774). 
The five consortium partners who carried out the project jointly are: the European University 
Institute, the Migration Policy Group (Brussels), University College Dublin, University of 
Edinburgh and Maastricht University. 
In its 18-month programme (from October 2011 to April 2013), ACIT developed four sets 
of citizenship indicators on citizenship laws (CITLAW), their implementation (CITIMP), 
and their impact on acquisition rates (CITACQ) and integration policies (CITINT) in all 27 
EU Member States and accession candidate and EEA countries (Croatia,  Iceland,  FYROM 
Macedonia, Norway,  Switzerland, and Turkey). Ten EU Member States  (Austria, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom) were selected 
for in-depth case studies because of their large immigrant and foreign populations, diverse 
citizenship laws and particularly high or low acquisition rates. National stakeholder round-
tables were organised by NGO/think-tank partners in these 10 countries (in Vienna, Tallinn, 
Paris, Berlin, Budapest, Dublin, Rome, Lisbon, Barcelona, London). Simultaneously with the 
ACIT project, EUDO CITIZENSHIP has expanded and updated its national and interna-
tional legal databases and country reports. 
ACIT made the first-ever impact assessment of citizenship laws in each country and across 
Europe.1 The findings compare the impact of legal rules with that of societal factors such as 
origin, residence duration, gender, age and social status. In addition to databases, graphic 
tools for the four indicator strands and national reports research results are disseminated 
in ten national handbooks and four comparative analytical reports based on the indicators. 
Academic researchers, government and civil society now have access to comprehensive data, 
comparative analyses and practical guidelines on how to evaluate the outcomes of citizenship 
policies, set targets and good governance standards, and assess the prospective impact of pol-
icy changes. ACIT contributes thereby to evidence-based policies and more effective prac-
tices for integration and acquisition of citizenship by creating authoritative, comprehensive 
and easy-to-use databases, which foster European information exchange and cooperation.
The present report presents short summaries of main results based on the CITLAW, CITIMP, 
CITACQ and CITINT indicators as well as an EU module with policy standards and recom-
mendations.
1  Dronkers, J. and M.P. Vink (2012), “Explaining Access to Citizenship in Europe: How Policies Affect Natu-
ralisation Rates”, European Union Politics, 13(3): 390–412.
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executive summary
CITIzEnshIp LAw IndICATors (CITLAw)
Ius sanguinis citizenship (by descent from a citizen parent) is available in fairly inclusive 
ways in each of the countries in our sample and remains the primary channel for the ac-
quisition of citizenship in Europe. In contrast, ius soli citizenship (entitlement to citizen-
ship by birth in the territory) varies considerably across Europe. There is a clear a distinc-
tion in ius soli trends between EU-15 and EU-12 countries. Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain all provide for ius soli citizenship 
either at birth or after birth for children born in the country (contingent upon residence 
requirements for the individual and/or the individual’s parents). At the other end of the 
scale, a number of countries have no ius soli provisions apart from those for foundlings 
and stateless children. 
Ordinary residence-based naturalisation varies significantly across Europe, in terms of the 
length and type of residence required and the presence and degree of additional require-
ments. The ‘effective’ residence requirement (calculated on the basis of required length and 
residence permit and permissible interruptions) ranges from 3 to 20 years and is slightly 
more demanding in the EU-12 than the EU-15. While most EU-15 countries have moved 
towards partial or full toleration of dual citizenship, several EU-12 countries still require 
the renunciation of a foreign nationality for naturalisation. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania are least tolerant of dual citizenship. The language skills requirements of the 
EU-12 Member States are generally more demanding than those of the EU-15. Conversely, 
civic knowledge tests and cultural assimilation requirements are slightly more common in 
EU-15 nations than in EU-12 nations. A majority of EU countries in our sample do not 
have requirements regarding employment or economic resources for naturalisation. 
Many states provide certain categories of persons with a privileged access to citizenship 
based on their special ties or contributions to the country. For example, nearly all coun-
tries provide easier access to citizenship for close relatives of citizens or of naturalisation 
applicants. On average, family-based naturalisation is slightly more generous in the EU-15 
compared to the EU-12.
Regarding loss of citizenship, every European country studied allows for the voluntary re-
nunciation of citizenship and, apart from Lithuania, all require in this case the possession 
or imminent acquisition of another citizenship. Every country except Poland provides for 
the involuntary loss of citizenship in certain cases. Long-term or permanent residence 
abroad, the acquisition of a foreign nationality, or the establishment of a foreign nation-
ality are considered by many countries to indicate a sufficiently strong loss of ties to the 
country to justify the withdrawal of citizenship, provided that the person has access to 
another nationality and does not become stateless.
CITIzEnshIp ImpLEmEnTATIon IndICATors (CITImp)
Across Europe, ordinary naturalisation procedures involve as many obstacles as opportu-
nities for immigrants to become citizens. Countries in the North and Northwest of Europe 
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often have stronger judicial review and, to some extent, less bureaucracy and documen-
tation requirements. New and smaller countries of immigration, mostly in Central or 
Southern Europe, often have weaker judicial review and more discretion in procedures. 
Overall, European countries that facilitate the ordinary naturalisation requirements in 
their citizenship law do not necessarily facilitate the procedure. No systematic relation-
ship emerges between CITLAW and CITIMP indicators for ordinary naturalisation due 
to significant outlier countries, particularly Estonia and Latvia whose laws are extremely 
restrictive while procedures produce few additional obstacles. The converse is true for 
Cyprus, Malta, or Ireland, where an inclusive citizenship law is combined with extremely 
cumbersome and discretionary naturalisation procedures.
We first studied the role of promotional activities as a dimension of implementation. Most 
countries only provide the ‘basic’ materials at ‘normal’ costs. The EU-15 countries usually 
have slightly more information and counselling services, easier-to-understand materials 
and web facilities. 
The documentation required is another significant obstacle for ordinary naturalisation in 
many states of Europe. Most countries have few exemptions from documentation, com-
plicated requirements for country of origin documentation and few alternatives to prove 
identity.
Discretion is a major problem in the ordinary naturalisation procedure in half the coun-
tries studied. Ordinary naturalisation is a right for applicants who meet the legal require-
ments in only twelve of the 35 countries studied. Generally, most countries’ requirements 
tend to be clearer and more objective with regard to residence requirements and, to a lesser 
extent, the criminal record and exemptions from renunciation of a foreign nationality. 
Economic resource, language and integration assessments are among the most discretion-
ary requirements across countries. 
Most ordinary naturalisation procedures involve some element of bureaucracy. Legal time 
limits for processing the application are usually long and ineffectual. Procedures headed 
by ministers or legislatures tend to involve more authorities, less expertise on citizenship 
and the dispersal amongst various agencies of the responsibilities for receiving, checking 
and deciding on the application. 
Most countries have a right to appeal built into the naturalisation procedure, including 
judicial review processes. Appeal decisions can cover substantive aspects as well as proce-
dural aspects in nearly all countries that offer a right to appeal. In terms of powers, in only 
ten of the countries studied do judges have the power to overturn a rejection and grant 
citizenship to the applicant. The standard judicial review procedures hardly ever apply to 
language or integration assessments.
CITIzEnshIp ACquIsITIon IndICATors (CITACq)
The share of acquisition of citizenship varies greatly among foreign-born immigrants in 
the EU15, Switzerland and Norway (in 2008). On average, just 34% of foreign-born per-
sons are citizens of their country of residence. Shares are lowest in Luxembourg (10%) 
and highest in Sweden (67%). The time it takes foreign-born immigrants to naturalise also 
varies across Europe. On average, it takes around 10 years for them to acquire citizenship 
in the EU-15 countries.
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Why do some immigrants naturalise and others not? Immigrants’ likelihood to natural-
ise does not only depend on where they come from, but also on where they go, since 
the citizenship policy in the destination country has a significant impact. The level of de-
velopment of the country of origin is a crucial factor in understanding the relationships 
between, on the one hand, citizenship policies and, on the other hand, individual-level 
features and citizenship acquisition rates in Europe. Immigrants in Europe coming from 
medium and under-developed countries are on average 2.5 times more likely to be citi-
zens of their country or residence than those originating from highly developed countries. 
Because large differences exist between immigrants in their motivation to naturalise, the 
impact of citizenship policies varies for these two groups. Immigrants from less developed 
countries are twice as likely to naturalise in countries with very inclusive citizenship poli-
cies. Citizenship policies matter more for immigrants from less developed countries, espe-
cially for newcomers. In addition, socio-economic features such as education and employ-
ment status are indeed significant for the uptake of citizenship, but only for immigrants 
from less developed countries.
CITIzEnshIp InTEGrATIon IndICATors (CITInT)
This research strand conducted descriptive analyses of the socio-economic positions of 
native-born citizens, naturalised citizens, and non-naturalised immigrants, particularly 
third-country nationals. Across the EU-15, both non-naturalised and naturalised immi-
grants are more economically active than natives. In the EU-12 states, naturalised immi-
grants are less economically active than non-naturalised immigrants and natives. In most 
European countries, the unemployment and over-qualification rates are lower amongst 
naturalised than non-naturalised citizens. Naturalised immigrants have higher levels of 
educational attainment than non-naturalised immigrants in most European countries, 
though gaps between population groups are usually fairly small. 
In terms of housing, first-generation immigrants have more difficulty paying usual house-
hold expenses than natives. In the majority of cases, the gaps between naturalised im-
migrants and natives are smaller than those between non-naturalised immigrants and 
natives. In countries where reliable data is available, it appears that naturalised immi-
grants are less likely to have had unmet healthcare needs than non-naturalised immi-
grants. Naturalised immigrants are less likely than non-naturalised immigrants to live in 
housing in areas where pollution, grime, other environmental problems, crime, violence, 
or vandalism. Naturalised immigrants spend a smaller share of their monthly income on 
their housing costs than non-naturalised immigrants. In addition, naturalised immigrants 
are also generally more likely to own their accommodation. There is no clear-cut pattern 
about concentration in social housing.
whAT wE ALL hAvE In Common: sETTInG A sTAndArd for 
ThE ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy by ImmIGrAnTs And ThEIr 
dEsCEndAnTs
The partners in this project are setting a standard for national legislation and policies on 
the acquisition of nationality for immigrants and their descendants. This standard builds 
on the decade-long comparative research agenda and on the issues raised in the ten na-
tional stakeholder roundtables.
European countries face three major challenges in relation to their citizenship policies. 
First, Member States regulate access to EU citizenship under their own citizenship laws 
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and want to preserve this privilege as an expression of their sovereignty and self-determi-
nation. Second, the citizens of Member States are also citizens of the European Union who 
enjoy free movement and admission rights in all other Member States. Member States’ 
policies on the acquisition and loss of citizenship must take into account the general prin-
ciples of EU law, specifically those of proportionality and effective remedies. Third, the EU 
and its Member States have a common interest in promoting full integration of long-term 
immigrants and their descendants through naturalisation and ius soli, in order to avoid 
settled immigrants being deprived of secure residence and political representation and to 
promote a sense of shared membership among both native and immigrant origin popula-
tions. 
The basic right of Member States to self-determination in matters of citizenship laws and 
policies sets limits to any political initiative for coordinating or harmonising citizenship 
laws and policies at the EU level. Although the three challenges point in different direc-
tions, citizenship policies can be reformed in such a way that each of the legitimate in-
terests involved is taken into account. We indicate below only the main goals of such re-
forms and support the argument with evidence from the ACIT research and stakeholder 
roundtables, while leaving open the procedures how they could be promoted or achieved 
through specific actions taken by the European Commission, European Parliament, or 
Council of Europe. 
The first section of this standard is an introduction that explains why the acquisition of 
nationality matters for integration. It also explains how countries can diagnose and rem-
edy the causes of low naturalisation rates. The second section provides the core stand-
ards for policies and procedures on the acquisition of nationality by immigrants and their 
descendants. This standard assists lawmakers and practitioners to improve the law and 
procedure in their respective country. In the third section, each of the standards is further 
elaborated in an explanatory report in terms of the benefits for immigrants, for the state 
and for society. 
ovErvIEw of sTAndArd for ThE ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy 
by ImmIGrAnTs And ThEIr dEsCEndAnTs
1.  ACQUISITION OF NATIONALITY BASED ON BIRTHRIGHT OR SOCIALISATION
2. NATURALISATION OF MINOR CHILDREN 
3. ORDINARY NATURALISATION
3.1. LEGAL RESIDENCE
3.2. LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE
3.3. CIVIC RESPONISBILITIES
3.4. NO SERIOUS THREAT TO PUBLIC POLICY OR PUBLIC SECURITY
3.5. COST
4. MULTIPLE NATIONALITY
5.  NATURALISATION OF PERSONS WITH SPECIAL EFFECTIVE LINKS TO THE 
COUNTRY
6. PROCEDURES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF NATIONALITY
6.1. DOCUMENTATION FOR ORDINARY NATURALISATION 
6.2. A PUBLIC SERVICE WELCOMING CITIZENS-TO-BE
6.3. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
6.4. EQUAL TREATMENT AND RECOGNITION OF NEW CITIZENS
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citizenship LaW indicators 
(citLaW)
Through their citizenship laws, states determine whom they recognize as their citizens. 
The laws of EU Member States determine furthermore who will be citizens of the Union. 
In much of the contemporary literature, citizenship laws are compared with regard to one 
single aspect: the extent to which they select and include as citizens non-European im-
migrants and their descendants. This is a very important question, but it is certainly not 
the only relevant one. States pursue multiple purposes when determining their citizenry 
(Vink and Bauböck 2013)2. Some of these purposes have little to do with immigration, 
but may still have important unintended side effects for immigrants’ access to citizenship.
Based on the EUDO CITIZENSHIP typology of 27 modes of acquisition and 15 modes of 
loss of citizenship, CITLAW indicators allow for the quantitative comparison and analysis 
of the multiple purposes of citizenship law. 
CITLAW indicators measure the degree of inclusion and freedom of choice for the target 
groups of different legal provisions. Basic indicator scores are calculated on the basis of a 
list of substantive and procedural requirements for each mode of acquisition or loss using 
both additive and weighting formulas.
CITLAW indicators are aggregated at different levels in order to analyse more general 
features of citizenship laws. The six highest-level CITLAW indicators that are calculated 
by combining the 45 basic indicators are ius sanguinis, ius soli, residence-based ordinary 
naturalisation, naturalisation on specific grounds, voluntary renunciation and involuntary 
withdrawal or lapse.
CITLAW indicators do not express a normative evaluation about how inclusive citizen-
ship laws ought to be. They aim to measure objectively how inclusive legal provisions 
are for their specific target groups. There are many different target groups of citizenship 
laws, such as first and later generation immigrants, first and later generation emigrants, 
refugees, stateless persons, family members of citizens or co-ethnic populations abroad. It 
makes therefore no sense to compare the overall inclusiveness of citizenship laws. 
CITLAW indicators have been calculated for 36 European states.3 We use the following 
labels for average indicators: Europe for all 36 states, EU-27 for all 2012 member states of 
the EU, EU-15 for the pre-2004 EU member states and EU-12 for the post-2004 accession 
states.
The first instalment of CITLAW indicators is based on citizenship laws at the end of 2011. 
In the future we plan to offer series for past years that allow for the analysis of trends over 
time.
2  Vink, M. and Bauböck, R. “Citizenship Configurations: analysing the multiple purposes of citizenship 
regimes in Europe”, Contemporary European Studies, Volume 11, Number 5 (2013).
3  EU-27, Croatia, Iceland, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey
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summAry of fIndInGs
Ius Sanguinis
Ius sanguinis citizenship (by descent from a citizen parent) is available in fairly inclusive 
ways in each of the countries in our sample and remains the primary channel for the acqui-
sition of citizenship in Europe. Compared to other CITLAW indicators, there is less vari-
ation across countries when it comes to ius sanguinis provisions. The average score is the 
same (0.90) for the four main country clusters: Europe, EU-15, EU-12 and EU-27. 
Bulgaria, Estonia, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Norway, Slovakia and Spain 
receive scores of 1, indicating unconditional ius sanguinis ex patre and ex matre in the cases 
of birth in the country or birth abroad. The lowest scores are obtained by Malta (0.38) and 
Austria (0.63). These comparatively low scores are due to restrictions on ex patre ius san-
guinis in the case of birth outside of marriage. Whereas Austria confers ius sanguinis ret-
roactively if the Austrian father marries the mother of the child, Malta provides no such 
option for overcoming the ex patre restriction. The European Court of Human Rights has 
judged such unequal treatment of children born in and out of wedlock as discriminatory 
(Genovese v. Malta, 2011). An amendment to the Austrian citizenship law adopted in June 
2013 will allow for Austrian fathers to pass on citizenship by descent to children out of wed-
lock if they recognise the child within 8 weeks after birth.
Many countries score between 0.80 and 1 due to requirements of registration or declaration 
of ius sanguinis citizenship the case of birth abroad. 
Ius Soli
Acquisition of citizenship by birth in the state territory (ius soli) is assessed by five basic 
indicators. The overall ius soli indicator provides a single summary score for ius soli provi-
sions. The principal forms by which citizenship is awarded on this ground – second and 
third generation birth in the country – are given the greatest weight in the calculation of 
the combined ius soli indicators. Ius soli after birth and the provisions for foundlings and 
otherwise stateless children are also considered, but with less weight. 
As shown in the ius soli map, there is considerable variation among countries. Scores range 
from Cyprus (0) up to France (0.73), Ireland (0.79) and Portugal (0.81). Since the Irish Re-
public has abolished unconditional ius soli in 2004, no country in Europe offers automatic 
citizenship to any child born in its territory (as the U.S. and Canada do).
There is a clear a distinction in ius soli trends between EU-15 (0.51) and EU-12 (0.15) na-
tions. Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal 
and Spain all provide for ius soli citizenship either at birth or after birth for children born in 
the country (contingent upon birthplace or residence requirements for the individual and/
or the individual’s parents). At the other end of the scale, a number of countries cluster with 
an overall very low ius soli score of 0.13 (Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro, Sweden4 and Turkey). In these states there are no ius soli provisions apart from 
those for foundlings and stateless children.
4  While Sweden receives a ius soli score of only 0.13, it does have a very inclusive compensatory naturalisation 
entitlement for minors after 5 years of residence independently of their birthplace, which is not present in the 
other countries in this list. 
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overall inclusion through ius soli provisions 
Ordinary Naturalisation
Every country in our sample allows for the acquisition of citizenship by residence-based 
naturalisation. There is significant variation across our sample, however, in the length and 
type of residence that is required for naturalisation and the presence and degree of addi-
tional conditions for naturalisation. 
The number of required years of residence stated in citizenship laws is no good indicator 
for the inclusiveness of residence-based naturalisation. We have therefore calculated an 
effective residence requirement that takes into account allowed interruptions and per-
manent residence status requirements. The weighted effective residence required in our 
sample ranges from 3 to 20 years. Belgium has the shortest residency requirement of any 
country in our sample: three years of legal residence without continuity or permanent 
status conditions. At the other end of the scale is Moldova, where an individual must re-
side in the country habitually, uninterruptedly and with a permanent residence permit for 
10 years prior to the application for naturalisation. Generally, residence requirements are 
slightly less demanding in EU-15 compared to the EU-12 countries (0.61 versus 0.47 in 
the standardised indicator that measures the inclusiveness of this provision). 
In addition to the residence criteria, we measure other conditions for naturalisation: re-
nunciation of a foreign nationality, language skills, civic knowledge and cultural assimi-
lation, absence of criminal record and sufficient economic resources. We also consider 
whether the procedure for ordinary naturalisation is discretionary grant by the authorities 
or an individual entitlement of the applicant who meets all conditions. 
While most EU-15 countries have moved towards partial or full toleration of dual citizen-
ship, several EU-12 countries still require the renunciation of a foreign nationality for natu-
ralisation. Notably, Bulgaria, Estonia and Lithuania provide no exceptions to the renuncia-
tion requirement even for refugees or in case of denial of release by the country of origin.
0.00                                   0.81
Key: bluer 
countries are more 
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are less inclusive.
 
Source: CITLAW 
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The language skills requirements of the EU-12 Member States are generally more demand-
ing than those of the EU-15. Conversely, civic knowledge tests and cultural assimilation 
requirements are slightly more common in EU-15 nations than in EU-12 nations. 
When it comes to criminal record conditions, there is no clear divide between EU-12 and 
EU-15 nations. Interestingly, however, the non-EU states included in our sample score 
higher than the EU average. Croatia and Serbia have no criminal record conditions for 
naturalisation and the requirements in other non-EU countries such as Iceland, Moldova 
and Norway are relatively undemanding.
Conditions for ordinary naturalisation in the most inclusive (belgium and portugal) 
and the most restrictive states (switzerland and Lithuania)
Fourteen countries in our sample do not have requirements regarding employment or 
economic resources for naturalisation. Austria, Denmark, France, Hungary, Iceland, Italy 
and Switzerland have onerous employment and/or welfare dependency conditions that 
extend back to several years before the application for naturalisation. There is no clear pat-
tern within or across any of the country groups. 
Special Naturalisation
Sixteen basic indicators measure the strength of provisions that offer certain categories 
of persons privileged access to citizenship based on their special ties or contributions to 
the country. The reasons for fast track naturalisation provisions are extremely diverse. It 
is therefore not easy to interpret a general purpose that states pursue when offering easier 
naturalisation to widely diverse categories. However, we still think that a general indicator 
for special naturalisation shows an important characteristic of a citizenship regime. A low 
score for special naturalisation indicates that a state generally considers the conditions of 
ordinary naturalisation as a the main pathway to citizenship through which all applicants 
have to pass, which is more likely if it sees itself as a country of regular immigration, 
whereas a high special naturalisation indicator shows that citizenship is used a tool for 
many different purposes, some of which are unrelated to immigration. 
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Belgium (0.53), Greece (0.51) and Turkey (0.52) receive the highest scores for special nat-
uralisation as a result of privileged access for several different categories of applicants. Bel-
gium, for example, offers facilitated naturalisation for foreign-born individuals resident in 
the country as children, for children and spouses of citizens, former citizens, ‘good-faith 
citizens’ (i.e. individuals presumed to be citizens for many years), refugees and stateless 
persons. 
Denmark receives the lowest score for special naturalisation (0.17) because it imposes 
much more onerous residence and integration conditions and a renunciation requirement 
on largely the same categories of applicants that get easy access in Belgium.
Nearly all countries provide easier access to citizenship for close relatives of citizens or 
of naturalisation applicants. Six indicators measure such family-based special naturalisa-
tion. Finland was the country that offered the least special privileges to family members 
(0.14) and Turkey the state that offered the strongest ones (0.74. On average, family-based 
naturalisation is slightly more generous in the EU-15 (0.38) compared to the EU-12 (0.33).
privileged naturalisation based on family ties to citizens or naturalisation applicants
Voluntary Renunciation
Every country in our sample allows for the renunciation of a foreign nationality and, apart 
from Lithuania, all require in this case the possession or imminent acquisition of anoth-
er nationality. Several countries, however, permit renunciation only by citizens residing 
abroad. There are varying degrees of restrictions, with more variation among provisions 
for renunciation in the country. Many countries accept a declaration of renunciation by 
individuals who reside abroad, but release residents in the country only on a discretionary 
basis. 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom allow 
for renunciation of foreign nationality by declaration both inside the country and while 
0.14                                   0.74
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12 aCIt
resident abroad. Many countries provide for the release of nationality only if the individual 
does not have any unfulfilled military or public obligations to the country. Bulgaria, Czech 
Republic, Ireland, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, Spain and Switzerland allow for 
renunciation only in the case of residence abroad.
how easy is it to for citizens residing abroad to renounce their nationality?
Involuntary Loss
Every country in our sample except Poland provides for the involuntary loss of citizenship 
in certain cases. We have identified twelve modes through which an individual can invol-
untarily lose his or her citizenship. These modes are here grouped into four categories: loss 
of ties, disloyalty, noncompliance and family-based loss. We find that unrestricted, auto-
matic loss of citizenship is not common in our sample. The Netherlands receives the lowest 
involuntary loss score (0.50), which means that the state has relatively stronger powers and 
more grounds on which to withdraw citizenship. Most countries achieve an overall invol-
untary loss score of 0.75 or higher, indicating that most countries take measures to ensure 
that persons are deprived of their citizenship only if they lack a sufficient connection to 
the country.
Only three countries (Greece, Poland, Portugal and Serbia) do not provide for involuntary 
loss based on loss of genuine links to the country. Long-term or permanent residence 
abroad, the acquisition of a foreign nationality, or the establishment of a foreign nation-
ality are considered by many countries to indicate a sufficiently strong loss of ties to the 
country to justify the withdrawal of nationality, provided that the person has access to 
another nationality and does not become stateless.
A relatively small number of countries in our sample provide for loss based on perceived 
disloyalty by citizens. Thirteen countries have no provisions for loss based on these 
grounds. Those that do impose loss on these grounds vary as to which of the following 
types of offences merit withdrawal: service in a foreign army, public service for a foreign 
0.50                                   1.00
Key: bluer 
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redder countries 
make it more 
difficult. 
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country, disloyalty or treason, or serious but not necessarily treasonous criminal offences. 
Several countries provide for automatic lapse as a consequence of military or public ser-
vice in a foreign country.
In many countries non-compliance with certain legal conditions can lead to loss. The re-
tention of a foreign nationality despite a renunciation requirement, or the discovery of 
fraud in the acquisition of citizenship can lead to loss in all but seven countries in our sam-
ple (Croatia, Czech Republic, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia and Sweden). Only Germany 
and Lithuania withdraw even citizenship acquired at birth (by ius soli in Germany and by 
ius sanguinis in Lithuania) if the person fails to renounce a foreign citizenship before a 
certain age (of 21 in Lithuania and 23 in Germany).
A majority of countries in our sample have provisions for loss due to changes in the citi-
zenship status of, or relationship with, family members. In the case that citizenship was 
acquired based on a relationship with a citizen family member, loss of citizenship by that 
family member or annulment of the family relationship can result in automatic loss in 
many countries. Similarly, the adoption of a minor by foreign citizens can lead to loss of 
citizenship by the minor in Belgium, Germany, Romania and Switzerland. 
Austria, Croatia and Czech Republic have unrestricted, automatic loss for minor children 
whose parents lose citizenship. No exceptions are made for individuals who have resided 
in the country for many years.
states with strong protection (serbia and poland) and weak protection (netherlands 
and Lithuania) against involuntary loss of citizenship
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citizenship impLementation 
indicators (citimp)
The provisions for ordinary naturalisation measured by CITLAW indicators determine 
which foreign residents may apply for naturalisation and the conditions for doing so laid 
down in the law. However, these legal provisions are not the only opportunities and obsta-
cles that immigrants face on the path to citizenship. Administrative procedures are crucially 
important for the implementation of these legal provisions and guarantee access in practice. 
In one country, the same naturalisation law often works out differently for different people. 
Eligible foreign residents must be informed about the law and encouraged to apply. Ap-
plicants must be able to prove that they meet the conditions in the law. Various authorities 
must be willing and able to check the application and come to a final decision. In a few 
countries, their decision must be strictly based on sufficiently specified conditions in the 
law. In most, authorities retain wider discretion. The ways that laws are implemented can 
lead to significant variation in naturalisation rates between similar groups of applicants and 
over time. 
Based on existing literature on the implementation of naturalisation policies, the ACIT pro-
ject calculated ‘Implementation Indicators’ (CITIMP), which measure the formal steps of 
the ordinary naturalisation procedures. Especially where naturalisation is largely discretion-
ary, access will be strongly determined by informal administrative practices that vary across 
regions, offices and individual civil servants. These informal implementation practices can 
only be studied through observation, analysis of individual dossiers and interviews with ap-
plicants and civil servants. A systematic comparison of a large number of states cannot pos-
sibly cover these differences. The ACIT project has therefore focused on aspects concerning 
the implementation of naturalisation provisions that are formally regulated. 
Implementation indicators provide an important link between citizenship law (CITLAW) 
and acquisition rates (CITACQ). The 38 CITIMP indicators refer only to the implementa-
tion of ordinary (residence-based) naturalisation and leave aside facilitated access for spe-
cial target groups, which often constitute a significant share in the overall number of natu-
ralisations. They are grouped together into five dimensions, which cover all stages of the 
procedure:
1. Promotion: how do authorities help applicants to meet the legal conditions? 
2. Documentation: how do applicants to prove that they meet the legal conditions?
3. Discretion: how much room do authorities have to interpret the legal conditions?
4. Bureaucracy: how do authorities to come to a decision?
5. Review: how strong is judicial oversight of the procedure?
CITIMP indicators have been calculated for 35 European states, as well as for three Ger-
man federal states. Using publicly available information, national citizenship experts in each 
country analysed the procedure in their country as of 31 December 2011. They were asked 
to produce in-depth narrative reports, fill in a comparative questionnaire and assign pre-
liminary scores for the indicators, which were double-checked by MPG’s research coordina-
tor for their clarity and consistency. On a 0 to 1 scale for all indicators, countries with scores 
closer to 1 promote access or create fewer obstacles in the procedures implementing the 
legal conditions for ordinary naturalisation. Countries with scores closer to 0 create more 
obstacles in the implementation of the naturalisation law. 
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summAry of fIndInGs
Inclusiveness of ordinary naturalisation procedures (CITImp overall average) 
Across Europe, ordinary naturalisation procedures involve as many obstacles as opportu-
nities for immigrants to become citizens. This map presents the overall score for the inclu-
siveness of the naturalisation procedure, which is the simple average of the five dimensions 
measured. The overall scores are relatively low (only 0.42 for the EU27). The most inclusive 
overall procedure is only ‘slightly’ favourable (score ≥0.60 and < 0.80) for naturalisation in 
Sweden (the highest score, only 0.68), Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg, Germany and France. 
Procedure emerges as ‘slightly favourable’ in 15 European countries studied. 
Ordinary naturalisation procedures are generally more favourable in established coun-
tries of immigration or other countries that liberalised the law. Countries in the North 
and Northwest of Europe often have stronger judicial review and, to some extent, less bu-
reaucracy and documentation requirements. New and smaller countries of immigration, 
mostly in Central or Southern Europe, often have weaker judicial review and more discre-
tion in procedures not only for naturalisation. In addition, countries tend to have more 
favourable procedures if they liberalised their ordinary naturalisation law in recent years. 
Compared to other countries in their regions, Finland, Germany, Greece, Luxembourg, 
Portugal and Sweden have easier procedures, including strong judicial review, limited dis-
cretion and bureaucracy and more promotion measures. The absence of liberal citizenship 
reform helps to explain the complicated procedures in Austria, Ireland, Italy and Switzer-
land. The two clear exceptions in Europe are Estonia and Latvia, due to the exceptional 
situation of the many stateless Russophones.
Key: Bluer 
countries have 
fewer procedural 
obstacles, while 
redder countries 
have more 
obstacles.
Source: CITIMP 
indicators0.16                                    0.68
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promoTIon: how muCh do AuThorITIEs hELp AppLICAnTs To 
mEET ThE LEGAL CondITIons? 
strength of promotion measures for ordinary naturalisation (strand average)
Most of the European countries studied take a limited role in promoting naturalisation. 
Inclusive laws are not always underpinned by strong promotional policies. The average of 
these CITIMP indicators leads to relatively low scores on promotion for the EU 27 (0.38) 
because most countries only provide the ‘basic’ materials at ‘normal’ costs. The EU-15 
countries (scoring 0.44) usually have slightly more information and counselling services, 
easier-to-understand materials and web facilities. The measures were only deemed ‘fa-
vourable’ for promoting naturalisation (score ≥ 0.80) in Estonia and Luxembourg and just 
‘slightly favourable’ (score ≥ 0.60) in Latvia and Sweden. 
official fee for application/issuance of citizenship title and legal exemptions
Key: Promotional 
measures are 
stronger in bluer 
countries and 
weaker in redder 
countries.
Source: CITIMP 
indicators
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The cost of application is another indicator of the state’s willingness to promote naturalisa-
tion among all eligible applicants. CITIMP found that the only countries with no official 
fee for ordinary naturalisation (application or issuance of citizenship) were Belgium (until 
2012), Estonia, France, Hungary, Poland and Spain. In 19 other European countries, these 
costs are often higher than the normal administrative costs in the country, for instance for 
the issuance of a passport. Austria and Switzerland have a wide range of sub-national fees 
(the maximums are presented in the chart below.
doCumEnTATIon: how EAsy Is IT for AppLICAnTs To provE 
ThAT ThEy mEET ThE LEGAL CondITIons?
Ease of documentation required for ordinary naturalisation (strand average)
The documentation required is another significant obstacle for ordinary naturalisation in 
many states of Europe. Most countries have few exemptions from documentation, com-
plicated requirements for country of origin documentation and few alternatives to prove 
identity. These hurdles exist across most European countries, particularly in the EU-12 
countries (averaging 0.34). Generally, documentation was found to be most demanding 
in Central and Southern Europe as well as countries like Austria, France, Ireland, Lux-
embourg and Switzerland. Documentation was most facilitated in the Baltic and Nor-
dic states, in Northwest Europe and the UK. The only countries with a favourable score 
(≥0.80) were Finland and the UK. 
Required documentation from the country of origin can be expensive, difficult, or impos-
sible to obtain Regularly, applicants must provide a copy of their birth certificate and, in ad-
dition, their ID or passport from the country of origin (21 of the countries studied). Most 
countries also require both translation and legalisation of such documents. Furthermore, 
many ordinary applicants must also obtain their criminal records from their country of 
origin (16 countries). For applicants unable to obtain documents from their country of ori-
gin, procedures foresee no alternative means to prove their identity in 15 countries studied.
Key: The 
documentation 
is easier in bluer 
countries and 
harder in redder 
countries.
Source: CITIMP 
indicators0.00                                    0.92
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Compared to their other requirements for ordinary naturalisation, countries are on aver-
age slightly more flexible with regard to documentation on required language skills. In 
contrast, most countries prescribe one specific way in which applicants must prove their 
integration (e.g. test, course, or interview). The assessment of the criminal record does 
not require documentation from applicants in around half the countries surveyed, be-
cause authorities obtain the information themselves. Applicants in most countries with 
economic resource requirements must provide additional documentation. Most countries 
with renunciation requirements force applicants to prove that they have renounced their 
foreign nationality. The European countries studied tend to make few legal exemptions on 
humanitarian or vulnerability grounds. Such exemptions can be found most frequently for 
renunciation requirements and, in some cases, for language and integration assessments. 
dIsCrETIon: how muCh powEr do AuThorITIEs hAvE To 
InTErprET ThE LEGAL CondITIons?
Limits on discretion in the ordinary naturalisation procedure (strand average)
Discretion is a major problem in the ordinary naturalisation procedure in half of the Eu-
ropean countries studied. Compared to promotion and documentation, the average of the 
CITIMP indicators on discretion is only slightly higher for the EU-27 (0.40). Divergences 
are wide not only between the EU-12 countries (averaging 0.30) and the EU-15 countries 
(0.50), but also within these groups of countries. Procedures and requirements are gener-
ally more discretionary in Central and Southern Europe. Procedures are more rights-based 
and clear in Northwest Europe. Procedures are generally less discretionary in countries 
with recent liberal reforms, such as Germany, Norway, Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg. 
In 2011, ordinary naturalisation was a right for applicants who met the legal requirements 
in only twelve of the 35 countries studied. Generally, most countries’ requirements tend to 
be more clear and objective with regard to residence requirement and, to a lesser extent, 
the criminal record and exemptions from renunciation of a foreign nationality. Economic 
resource requirements are among the most discretionary requirements across countries. 
Key: The procedure 
and requirements 
are more rights-
based and clear in 
bluer countries and 
more discretionary 
in redder countries.
Source: CITIMP 
indicators 0.00                                    0.89
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This widespread discretion may be due to the very nature of the vague wording of the re-
quirement (e.g. self-sufficiency, no recourse to public social assistance). Language and in-
tegration assessments are also often among the most discretionary requirements. The ways 
that language and integration assessments are implemented are strongly related across 
countries. CITIMP indicators register fewer procedural obstacles on language than inte-
gration assessments because countries tend to offer more ways for applicants to prove their 
language knowledge and more support to learn the language.
burEAuCrACy: how EAsy Is IT for AuThorITIEs To ComE To A 
dECIsIon?
Amount of bureaucracy within the ordinary naturalisation procedure (strand average)
On the extent of bureaucracy in naturalisation procedures, most countries’ CITIMP scores 
were generally low and clustered around the average for the EU-27 (0.49) with little over-
all difference between the EU-12 (0.46) and the EU-15 (0.50). No clear regional patterns 
emerge across. The major finding is that it is harder to arrive at consistent and quick deci-
sions when the decision-making authority is politically appointed (parliamentary, min-
isterial or presidential decision). Procedures headed by ministers or legislatures tend to 
involve more authorities, less expertise on citizenship and different responsibilities for 
receiving, checking and deciding on the application. Overall, the ordinary naturalisation 
procedure is usually less bureaucratic when the deciding authority is a judicial body or a 
specialised branch of the civil service. 
The CITIMP results indicate that most ordinary naturalisation procedures involve some 
level of bureaucracy. Checking the documentation often requires potentially time-con-
suming requests for data or advice from other authorities. Most ordinary naturalisation 
procedures require information or advice from more than one other authority more (in 23 
of the countries studied). Legal time limits for processing the application are usually long 
and ineffectual. Just under half of the European countries studied (15) impose legal time 
limits, which are generally long and renewable. Across Europe, there are no automatic 
Key: The 
procedure is least 
bureaucratic in 
bluer countries and 
most bureaucratic 
in redder countries.
Source: CITIMP 
indicators0.07                                    0.79
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effective sanctions or actions if authorities do not respect the legal time limit. Without 
effective enforcement measures, authorities across Europe regularly exceed the legal time 
limit, create backlogs and significant delays and uncertainty for applicants. 
rEvIEw: how sTronG Is judICIAL ovErsIGhT of ThE 
proCEdurE?
strength of judicial review of the ordinary naturalisation procedure (strand average)
The average of these CITIMP indicators leads to relatively higher scores on judicial review 
for the EU 27 (scoring 0.46), because most countries have the right to judicial review 
built into the naturalisation procedure, although this right is weaker for the language and 
integration assessment. The one clear pattern across Europe is stronger judicial review in 
EU-15 countries (0.54) than EU-12 countries (0.43), with a few exceptions, such as the 
Baltic countries.
 
In 2011 only seven countries do not have a clear legal right to a reasoned decision or 
judicial review: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland and Malta. Most 
ordinary naturalisation procedures across Europe include the right to a reasoned decision 
and some right to judicial appeal before national courts. One practical obstacle to access 
judicial review across Europe is the short time limit to lodge an appeal. Appeal decisions 
can cover substantive aspects as well as procedural aspects in nearly all countries that offer 
a right to appeal. In terms of powers, judges in only ten countries studied have the power 
to overturn a rejection and grant citizenship to the applicant.
The standard judicial review procedures hardly ever apply to language or integration as-
sessments. The right to a reasoned decision and judicial review for these assessments is 
absent in eleven countries. In these countries, immigrants who cannot pass the assessment 
must either retake it or try to arrange a review informally. Legal guarantees and review are 
present but significantly weaker in four additional countries. These assessments are gener-
ally subject to just some administrative review on procedural aspects.
Key: Judicial 
review is stronger 
in bluer countries 
and weaker or 
absent in redder 
countries.
Source: CITIMP 
indicators 0.00                                    0.94
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ConCLusIons
The CITIMP research has taken the first step from a comparative qualitative to a quantita-
tive assessment of the administrative obstacles and opportunities to naturalisation. The 
results suggest that most countries’ procedures contain as many obstacles as opportunities 
for ordinary naturalisation with many clear patterns across Europe. Promotional measures 
are often missing or poor quality. Legal exemptions for documentation rarely exist on hu-
manitarian or vulnerability grounds. Documentation from countries of origin is especially 
complicated for applicants. Not only are most ordinary naturalisation procedures discre-
tionary, but so are many language, integration and economic resource requirements. Most 
procedures involve potentially long processing times and some amount of bureaucracy, 
especially when the deciding authority is the executive or legislature. Judicial review is 
often not guaranteed for language or integration requirements or on specific issues such as 
discrimination within the procedure. 
The correlations emerging within the CITIMP results also deserve greater investigation. 
For example, European countries with stronger promotional measures tend to have less 
discretionary procedures. Bureaucratic procedures are related to complicated documenta-
tion and the level of state discretion. 
Moreover, this paper finds that European countries that facilitate their ordinary naturali-
sation law do not necessarily facilitate the procedure. No systematic relationship emerges 
between CITLAW and CITIMP due to significant outlier countries, particularly Estonia 
and Latvia. Furthermore, there is no significant relationship between the inclusiveness of 
its requirements (CITLAW) and the strength of promotional measures. The countries with 
the strongest promotion policies do not necessarily have inclusive laws. There is also no 
significant relationship between the difficulty of the legal requirements for ordinary natu-
ralisation (CITLAW) and the documentation required.
Whatever the interpretation of the meaning of these results, the descriptive analysis con-
firms the importance of measuring administrative practices. Looking only at the legal re-
quirements does not indicate what or how many obstacles exist in the naturalisation pro-
cedure. The CITIMP research allows researchers to investigate whether or not obstacles in 
law are related to obstacles in practices in the procedure.
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citizenship acQuisition 
indicators (citacQ)
EUDO Citizenship Acquisition Indicators (CITACQ) compare percentages of acquisition 
of citizenship among foreign-born persons in their country of residence, as well as the 
number of years it takes on average to acquire citizenship.
CITACQ is based on the 2008 Labour Force Survey and includes information on the fol-
lowing indicators for acquisition of citizenship:
•	 ALL: the percentage of foreign-born persons who have acquired the citizenship of the 
respective country of residence
•	 SEX: the percentage of foreign-born females and males who have acquired the citizen-
ship of the respective country of residence
•	 ORIGIN: the percentage of foreign-born persons from EU and non-EU countries who 
have acquired the citizenship of the respective country of residence
•	 AGE AT MIGRATION: the percentage of foreign-born persons who have acquired the 
citizenship of their country of residence, differentiated by the age at which the respond-
ent took up residence (age groups: 0-17 years; 18-39 years; 40+ years).
•	 YEARS OF RESIDENCE (by cohort): the percentage of foreign-born persons who have 
acquired the citizenship of their country of residence, differentiated by the number of 
years of residence (1-5 years; 6-10 years; 11-19 years; 20 + years).
•	 YEARS OF RESIDENCE (minimum number of years): the percentage of foreign-born 
persons who have acquired the citizenship of their country of residence, differentiated 
by the number of years the respondent has minimally resided there (at least 5 years; at 
least 10 years; at least 15 years; at least 20 years).
•	 TIME UNTIL NATURALISATION: the numbers of years it takes on average for for-
eign-born persons to acquire the citizenship of the respective country of residence.
•	 CITACQ indicators have been calculated for 25 European states. 
We use the following labels for average indicators (These data can be explored at CITACQ): 
EUROPE: all 36 states
EU 15: the pre-2004 EU member states in our sample
EU 12: the post-2004 accession states
CITACQ indicators differ from annual naturalisation rates, which generally measure the 
number of naturalisations as a percentage of the resident non-citizen population of the 
same year. Whereas such naturalisation rates are used to study the variation of new acqui-
sitions across years and countries, CITACQ acquisition rates show the cumulative effect 
of naturalisations over all previous years on the present resident population of first gen-
eration immigrants. They do therefore not necessarily reflect the impact of current citi-
zenship laws on naturalisation rates. The advantage of using survey data instead of annual 
naturalisation statistics is that only the former include those variables that are crucial for 
studying the socio-economic profile of naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants. 
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summAry of fIndInGs
Acquisitions of citizenship vary greatly among foreign-born persons in EU15, Switzer-
land and Norway (in 2008). Rates are lowest in Luxembourg (10%) and highest in Sweden 
(67%). On average, just 34% of foreign-born persons are citizens of their country of resi-
dence.
rates of acquisition of citizenship among immigrants in Eu-15, switzerland and 
norway, 2008 (%)
Acquisition rates among foreign-born are generally higher in EU-12 (51%) than in EU-15 
(34%), though this likely reflects only a selection bias in the survey data. In general the data 
for EU12 countries is not of sufficient quality to investigate in detail the acquisition rates in 
these countries due to small samples of immigrants in the used surveys.
rates of acquisition of citizenship among immigrants in Eu-12 countries, 2008 (%)
From the literature on immigrant naturalisation, we know that the origin of immigrants 
matters significantly. This is confirmed by the CITACQ data which show that immigrants 
from non-EU countries (42%) often acquire the citizenship more than twice as frequently 
as those from EU countries (20%). 
LA
TV
IA
ES
TO
NIA
EU
-15
EU
-12
CZ
EC
H R
EP
UB
LIC
HU
NG
AR
Y
PO
LA
ND
SLO
VA
KIA
SLO
VE
NIA
LIT
HU
AN
IA
100
80
60
40
20
0
all foreign-born persons
©
 E
U
DO
 / 
YO
U
N
G
M
IN
DS
Source: European 
Commission, 
Eurostat, Labour 
Force Survey Ad 
Hoc Module, 2008
Source: European 
Commission, 
Eurostat, Labour 
Force Survey Ad 
Hoc Module, 2008LU
XE
MB
OU
RG
IRE
LA
ND
SW
ITZ
ER
LA
ND
SP
AIN ITA
LY
GR
EE
CE
PO
RT
UG
AL
UN
ITE
D K
ING
DO
M
DE
NM
AR
K
BE
LG
IUM
AU
ST
RIA
GE
RM
AN
Y
NO
RW
AY
FR
AN
CE
NE
TH
ER
LA
ND
S
SW
ED
EN
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
all foreign-born persons
24 aCIt
rates of acquisition of citizenship among immigrants from Eu and non-Eu countries 
of origin, 2008 (%)
We find variation not only between the rates of immigrants who naturalise across Euro-
pean countries, but also with regard to how long it takes to naturalise. This reflects prob-
ably differences in policies on the acquisition of citizenship. On average, we find that it 
takes around 10 years for foreign-born persons to acquire the citizenship of their country 
of residence, within EU-15 countries. In Luxembourg it takes almost 15 years on average to 
naturalise. The lowest average time to naturalisation, around five years, was found in Ireland 
around 5 years, mostly due to the now-defunct entitlements for spouses and parents of Irish 
nationals. In the latter case (Ireland) the fast naturalisation is likely an illustration of the 
selective naturalisation procedure. This is similar as e.g. in Portugal in 2008, though here it 
the naturalisation procedure has become much more inclusive since the changes in 2006. 
Average number of years of residence until naturalisation among immigrants in Eu-
15, norway and switzerland, 2008 (average in years)
The data not of sufficient quality to investigate in detail acquisition rates in EU12 countries 
due to small samples of immigrants in surveys.
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muLTIvArIATE AnALysIs: ExpLAInInG nATurALIsATIon rATEs In 
wEsTErn EuropE
Source: Vink, M., T. Prokic-Breuer and J. Dronkers. Immigrant Naturalisation in the Con-
text of Institutional Diversity: Policy Matters, But to Whom? International Migration, 
2013 (forthcoming). 
Why do some immigrants naturalise and others not? In order to better understand the 
relevance of citizenship policies for immigrant naturalisation rates, we also perform a 
multivariate analysis where we take into account where an immigrant is from, in which 
European country he or she resides, as well as additional individual variables, such as age, 
gender, marital status, education and employment status.
While much of the literature emphasizes the importance of country of origin features 
and individual characteristics, there is surprisingly little systematic research on the rela-
tion between citizenship policies in destination countries and citizenship uptake among 
immigrants. Most research in this field draws on data from single country cases and has 
limited comparative scope. In this paper we analyse citizenship uptake among first genera-
tion immigrants in 16 European countries. We apply an explicit cross-national perspective 
and argue that immigrant naturalisation in Europe is determined not only by country of 
origin features and individual characteristics, but also by the opportunity structure set by 
the citizenship laws in the countries of origin and destination. 
More accessible policies on acquisition of citizenship matter little for immigrants from 
highly developed countries, particularly newcomers, but these laws matter significantly for 
immigrants from less developed countries. As the composition of immigrant populations 
and citizenship policies across Europe vary significantly, this comparative design is ideally 
suited to testing the relative importance of factors related to country of origin, individual 
background and legal opportunity structure.
For this analysis, we make use of a pooled dataset from the European Social Survey, which 
includes information on individual characteristics of respondents, including their country 
of origin.
Key findings: variation in acquisition rates among immigrants is mainly explained by:
•	 Socio-economic development of countries of origin
•	 Socio-economic status (immigrants with employment are more likely naturalised)
•	 Policy on acceptance of dual citizenship of country of origin
•	 Acquisition of citizenship policies in the country of destination (see graphs)
•	 Marital status (married immigrants are more likely naturalised)
•	 Gender (female immigrants are more likely naturalised)
•	 Use of native language at home (immigrants who speak the language of the destination 
country at home are more likely naturalised)
The most important finding of this paper is that the level of development of the country 
of origin is a crucial factor in understanding the relationships between, on the one hand, 
citizenship policies and, on the other hand, individual-level features and citizenship acqui-
sition rates in Europe. To arrive at this conclusion, our analysis first showed that demand 
for citizenship is influenced primarily by where immigrants are from. The level of human 
development of countries of origin accounts for the vast difference among immigrants in 
their likelihood to naturalise. Immigrants in Europe coming from medium and under-
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developed countries are on average 2.5 times more likely to have the citizenship than those 
originating from highly developed countries. These findings are in line with the literature 
and can be understood in terms of the perceived payoff attached to citizenship. Acquiring 
the citizenship of the country of residence has a much higher potential pay-off for immi-
grants originating from low-income countries than for those coming from developed and 
more prosperous societies. In this context, securing residence status in a country which 
offers a vast increase in security and life chances is a crucial incentive for immigrants to 
apply for naturalisation.
Because large differences exist between immigrants in their motivation to naturalise, the 
impact of citizenship policies varies for these two groups. In line with this idea, the legal 
framework set by the citizenship laws in the countries of origin and destination accounts 
for a difference in naturalisation rates, yet only for immigrants from less developed coun-
tries. In fact, not only are these immigrants twice as likely to naturalise in countries with 
very inclusive citizenship policies, but they are also the ones particularly affected by these 
policies. The graphs below show how policies affect immigrants’ uptake of citizenship on 
average in EU-15 countries, Norway and Switzerland. Citizenship policies matter more for 
immigrants from less developed countries, especially for newcomers (as the three lines in 
on the left are steeper than the lines for immigrants from higher developed countries on 
the right). 
probability of acquisition of citizenship in Eu-15 countries 
Second, we have shown that this origin factor is also related to the role of individual char-
acteristics in immigrants’ decisions to naturalise. Our differentiated analyses of the acqui-
sition of citizenship among two immigrant groups, from highly and from medium/un-
der-developed countries, show that different determinants play a role for different groups. 
Socio-economic features such as education and employment status are indeed significant 
for the uptake of citizenship, but only for immigrants from less developed countries. While 
we can hypothesize about the underlying dynamic, further research would be needed to 
investigate whether the importance of human capital for this group is because citizenship 
acquisition has a higher payoff for them or because they are better able to understand and 
manage the naturalisation procedure.
As for immigrants coming from highly developed countries, they are not only less like-
ly to naturalise, but whether or not they do so also seems to depend on few factors. If 
Immigrants from High HDI countries
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immigrants from highly developed countries naturalise at all, then years of residence play 
a crucial role in the process. For these immigrants, socio-economic and demographic fea-
tures only make a marginal difference in their decision to naturalise compared to the rel-
evance of the time spent in the country of destination. 
In other words, we conclude that immigrants’ likelihood to naturalise does not only de-
pend on where they are from, but also on where they go, since the citizenship policy in the 
destination country has a significant impact. However, crucially, while citizenship policies 
clearly affects naturalisation rates among immigrants, this relation is conditioned by the 
level of development of the origin countries of immigrants. Hence, for the question of how 
much it matters where one goes, it matters significantly where one is from.
AppEndIx: TEChnICAL dEsCrIpTIon of dATAsETs
CITACQ indicators:
•	 Source: Labour Force Survey Ad Hoc Module 2008 on the labour market situation of 
immigrants and their descendants (Eurostat). Eurostat has no responsibility for the re-
sults and conclusions which are those of the researchers.
•	 Target population: all persons aged between 15 and 74 (or 16 to 74 in countries where 
the target group for the core LFS is from 16 years old)
•	 All numbers presented in CITACQ are based on at least 100 respondents. Where sam-
ple size is too small, this is indicated in the dataset by ‘na’ (not available).
•	 Data presented on following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
•	 In Germany information on country of birth is missing for all respondents. To deter-
mine the region of origin (EU or non-EU), we have used the country of birth of the 
father and/or mother of the respondent (‘EU’ if either mother and/or father born in EU 
country).
•	 No data available (data not provided by Eurostat): Finland.
•	 Data excluded (sample size too small for descriptive purposes): Bulgaria, Malta and 
Romania.
Multivariate analysis:
•	 Source: European Social Survey, pooled dataset of waves 1-5 (2002-2010).
•	 Includes data on immigrants in following 16 countries: Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Denmark, Finland, Spain, France, The United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden.
•	 Includes data only on individuals who themselves and both of whose parents, were born 
outside the survey country.
•	 Includes data only on immigrants who reside for at least five years in the destination 
country. 
•	 Includes data only on individuals who were at least 18 years old on arrival. 
•	 Final dataset contains 7.489 immigrants
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citizenship integration 
indicators (citint)
ACIT has developed ten core indicators to measure the inclusion of immigrants (CITINT 
indicators) within and across countries in Europe and to assess the state of societal cohe-
sion in the EU. The ACIT project is primarily concerned with the effect of the acquisition 
of citizenship on the integration of first-generation immigrants. We compare socio-eco-
nomic outcomes of naturalised immigrants and non-naturalised immigrants with those 
of native-born citizens to measure integration. Third-country immigrants face distinct 
cultural and legal barriers to integration compared with EU citizens who exercise their 
right to free movement. Consequently, we also consider outcome differences in terms of 
region of birth (EU versus non-EU). Indicators are organized into three categories: labour 
force participation, social exclusion and living conditions. 
In many cases we report the extent of differences between groups of immigrants and the 
native citizens of their country of residence, rather than absolute values of the indicators. A 
direct comparison of the absolute values would not necessarily isolate differences that re-
late to citizenship status from general differences between countries that affect everybody 
including native citizens. In order to assess immigrant integration, we first establish the 
relative positions of groups of immigrants compared with the native citizens in the same 
country and make cross-national comparison of these positions.
LAbour forCE pArTICIpATIon
Description of Indicators
Participation in the local labour force is a fundamental indicator of immigrant integration. 
Employment contributes to economic security, but also supports social inclusion, civic 
involvement and health among immigrants. We use unemployment, levels of economic 
activity and over-qualification indicators to evaluate the nature of immigrant labour force 
participation relative to natives in Europe. Labour Force Participation indicators are de-
rived from the 2008 EU Labour Force Survey Ad Hoc Module on ‘The Labour Market 
Situation of Immigrants and Their Descendants’ (EU-LFS). 
Summary of Findings
Our analysis shows that immigrants in Europe are more likely than natives to be economi-
cally active, but are also more likely to be unemployed or overqualified for their jobs. 
In most countries in our sample, immigrants are more economically active than native-
born citizens. Across the EU-15, both non-naturalised immigrants and naturalised im-
migrants are more economically active than natives. In the EU-12 states, naturalised im-
migrants are less economically active than non-naturalised immigrants and natives. 
Though immigrants are more likely than natives to be active in the local labour force, 
they are also more likely to be unemployed. In most countries in the European Union, 
unemployment is higher among foreign-born than among native-born citizens (except in 
the UK and Slovakia). The extent of this varies between naturalised and non-naturalised 
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immigrants. In four EU states (Sweden, Greece, Belgium and Cyprus) plus Norway and 
Switzerland, the rate of unemployment is higher amongst naturalised than non-natural-
ised citizens – substantially so, in the first three cases. In the majority of other European 
states for which data are available, the reverse is true, consistent with the assumptions that 
naturalised citizens (especially those who have been in the country of destination longer), 
reap associated benefits (better social integration, improved language skills, increased op-
portunities for education and training in the host country, etc.) and that citizenship pro-
vides legal access to a wider pool of jobs. 
unemployment rates, Gap between Immigrants and natives, 2008 (%) 
Both amongst citizens and non-citizens in the countries of destination, the unemployment 
rate is generally higher for non-EU migrants than EU citizens using their free movement 
rights. This suggests that country and/or region of origin is also an important factor shap-
ing labour market outcomes for immigrants; immigrants from outside the EU, who may 
need to meet more extensive criteria to obtain work and residence permits, have greater 
incentive to naturalise in the country than EU citizens who have secured residence and 
employment rights. 
unemployment rate among Immigrants, by region of origin and Citizenship status, 
2008 (% Gap with natives)
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Over-qualification rates are much higher among immigrants than among native-born 
citizens.5 This is true for both EU citizens and third-country nationals. Gaps between 
immigrants and natives are larger for this indicator than for most other indicators in our 
study. Over-qualification rates are particularly high among non-naturalised immigrants 
in the southern European countries of Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Spain. 
over-qualification rates, Gaps with natives, non-naturalised Immigrants by region 
of origin, 2008 (%)
soCIAL ExCLusIon
Description of Indicators
Social exclusion of immigrants is closely related to non-participation in the labour force. 
Social exclusion, broadly defined, means being unable to participate in society because of 
a lack of material and non-material resources (Eurobarameter 2010). There is no single 
measure for poverty and social exclusion. Using both 2008 LFS data as well as 2008 cross-
sectional EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), we derive three ba-
sic indicators to evaluate the degree of social exclusion of immigrants in Europe: levels of 
education, the share of immigrants having difficulty making ends meet and the share with 
unmet healthcare needs. 
Summary of Findings
Generally, immigrants in Europe disproportionately share the demographic characteris-
tics of groups at risk of social exclusion. Non-naturalised immigrants have lower levels 
5  The overqualification rate is calculated as the share of the population aged 25 to 74 with a high educational 
level (university degree or higher) working in low or medium-skilled jobs (as defined by the International 
Standard Classification of Occupations) among employed persons having attained a high educational level of 
the same age group. Small samples of naturalised citizens for several countries prevent comparison of over-
qualification rates between naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants
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of educational attainment than naturalised and native-born citizens in most countries in 
Europe,6 though gaps between population groups are fairly small in most countries. 
There is a variance by citizenship status in the educational attainment of EU and non-EU 
immigrants. Among non-naturalised citizens, immigrants from other EU Member States 
generally have slightly higher levels of educational attainment than immigrants from out-
side the EU. This is true in the majority of countries in our sample, except for the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Ireland and Luxembourg. Among naturalised citizens, the trend is not 
as clear. In Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK, EU 
citizens have higher mean levels of educational attainment than immigrants from outside 
the EU. In France, Hungary, Ireland and Sweden, the reverse is true. 
First-generation immigrants have more difficulty paying usual household expenses than 
natives. In the majority of cases, the gaps between naturalised immigrants and natives are 
smaller than those between non-naturalised immigrants and natives, though there are 
several exceptions to this pattern. There is also a geographical aspect to the distribution: 
both amongst naturalised and non-naturalised immigrants, the percentage of respondents 
indicating that they have difficulty meeting their monthly expenses is higher among im-
migrants that originate from outside the EU than amongst intra-EU migrants. 
difficulty making Ends meet, Gaps with natives, 2008 (% of naturalised and non-
naturalised immigrants indicating difficulties, relative to natives)
Small sample sizes limit the number of countries included in the analysis of unmet health-
care needs, but in the countries for which reliable data are available, immigrants are more 
likely to have had an unmet healthcare need than natives. However, gaps between natives 
and immigrants are quite small—generally less than five percentage points. Non-natural-
ised immigrants are more likely to have had an unmet healthcare need than naturalised 
immigrants. 
6  The exceptions are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Portugal and Sweden (as well as Norway outside the 
EU), where foreign immigrants have the highest mean levels of educational attainment compared with natives 
and naturalised immigrants. The difference is generally very small, however.
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LIvInG CondITIons
Description of Indicators
Looking beyond basic economic circumstances, we turn to more qualitative evaluations 
of living standards – in particular, the quality of housing in which people dwell. Integra-
tion in housing involves more than simply comparing the quality of housing conditions 
between immigrants and natives in quantitative terms – e.g., size, facilities, use of social 
housing, etc. – although these are in themselves useful indicators. Stability in residence 
can help to foster community links which in turn impact positively upon integration in 
other ways. We use four core indicators to measure integration in the area of housing: 
quality of dwelling, levels of property ownership, social hosing occupation and housing 
cost burden. Living conditions indicators are derived from 2008 EU-SILC data. 
Summary of Findings
Immigrants in general are more likely than natives to live in housing in areas where pol-
lution, grime, other environmental problems, crime, violence, or vandalism are issues for 
the household. Non-naturalised immigrants are more likely than naturalised ones to live 
in housing with these problems. For all three indicators of poor dwelling situations, gaps 
between natives and immigrants are quite small (less than five percentage points). Immi-
grants from outside the EU are more likely than EU citizens to live in low quality housing. 
This is true for all three indicators of poor dwelling conditions. 
poor dwelling Indicators, Gaps with natives, Eu-27 Averages, 2008 (% of naturalised 
and non-naturalised immigrants indicating problems, relative to natives)
Non-naturalised immigrants are much less likely than natives to live in accommodation 
owned by someone in the household than either natives or naturalised citizens. This is 
largely in line with expectations, given that naturalised citizens are more likely to envisage 
a long-term relationship with their new country of citizenship. Gaps between naturalised 
immigrants and natives are particularly large in Spain, Luxembourg, Ireland and Portugal. 
Gaps between non-naturalised immigrants and natives are fairly large in most countries 
in our sample, with the most significant differences in Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg 
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and Austria. Estonia and Latvia are the exceptions to this rule, but this may be related to 
the particular nature of these two countries, as many of the non-citizens are long-term 
residents who were already living as Soviet citizens on the territories of these two states 
at the time of the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 and have not acquired the citizenship 
despite long-term settlement.
Level of property ownership, Gaps with natives, 2008 (%)
Immigrants from within the EU are more likely than immigrants from outside the EU to 
live in accommodation owned by someone in the household in most countries in our sam-
ple. In several countries in our sample, the difference in percentage points is larger than 10.
 
Missing data limits our analysis of immigrant clustering in social or public housing to 
only a few countries, but from those countries a clear trend emerges: immigrants are more 
likely to live in social housing than natives. There is, however, no clear-cut pattern as to 
whether naturalised immigrants are more or less densely congregated in social housing 
than non-naturalised ones. In Finland (where social housing numbers in general are much 
higher than average), France, Germany, Italy and Spain, non-naturalised immigrants are 
more likely to live in social housing than naturalised immigrants. In Austria, Belgium, Ire-
land and the United Kingdom, the reverse is true. Ireland is exceptional insofar as natives 
are more likely to live in social housing than either group of immigrants. 
It is important to note here that there is variation across Member States in policies regard-
ing access to social benefits and housing allowances, affecting cross-country variation in 
indicator values. Similarly, some countries provide housing allowance to certain groups 
of immigrants, such as refugees and asylum seekers, which might affect intra-country 
variation in social housing occupation. Whilst social housing occupation is generally an 
indication of poverty and social exclusion, the higher levels of social housing occupa-
tion amongst naturalised immigrants in some countries might paradoxically be a sign of 
greater integration into the system, insofar as it may be difficult for third-country nation-
als who are not asylum seekers or in special categories to access social housing and meet 
the qualifications for its allocation. 
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In the few countries where small sample sizes do not prevent comparison between EU 
and non-EU citizens (Austria, Belgium, France, Finland and the UK), immigrants from 
outside the EU are generally more likely to live in social housing than immigrants from 
other EU countries.
Immigrants spend a larger share of their monthly income on housing costs than native-
born citizens in Europe. Preliminary analysis suggests that higher housing cost burden 
among immigrants is due to not only lower disposable incomes for this group, but also 
generally higher monthly housing costs. Naturalised immigrants spend only slightly more 
(between zero and five percentage points) than native-born citizens, but non-naturalised 
immigrants in most countries are spending a share of their income that is close to or more 
than ten percentage points higher than the share that natives spend. Immigrants from 
outside the EU spend a larger share of their monthly income on housing costs than immi-
grants from the EU. The gap between non-EU and EU citizens is less pronounced among 
those who have naturalised. 
housing Cost burden, 2008 (% of monthly income spent on housing costs)
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AppEndIx: TEChnICAL dEsCrIpTIon of dATAsETs
Indicators are organized into three categories: labour force participation, social exclusion 
and living conditions. 
List of CITInT indicators
area of integration indicator data source
Labour force participation Unemployment rate LFS 2008 Ad Hoc Module
Economic activity rate LFS 2008 Ad Hoc Module
Overqualification rate LFS 2008 Ad Hoc Module
social Exclusion Education level LFS 2008 Ad Hoc Module
Difficulty making ends meet EU-SILC 2008
Unmet healthcare need EU-SILC 2008
Living Conditions Poor Dwelling EU-SILC 2008
Levels of property ownership EU-SILC 2008
Social housing occupation EU-SILC 2008
Housing cost burden EU-SILC 2008
LAbour forCE pArTICIpATIon
•	 Source: Labour Force Survey Ad Hoc Module 2008 on the labour market situation of 
immigrants and their descendants (Eurostat).
•	 Target population: all persons aged between 15 and 74 (or 16 to 74 in countries where 
the target group for the core LFS is from 16 years old).
•	 All numbers presented in CITINT are based on cases where the sample of immigrants 
is more than 100 OR the cell size (the number of respondents counted for the particular 
category) is more than 20.
•	 Data presented on following European countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Re-
public, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
•	 In Germany information on country of birth is missing for all respondents. To determine 
the region of origin (EU or non-EU), we have used the country of birth of the father and/
or mother of the respondent (‘EU’ if either mother and/or father born in EU country).
•	 No data available (data not provided by Eurostat): Finland.
•	 Data excluded (sample size too small for descriptive purposes): Bulgaria, Denmark, Ice-
land and Romania.
Since 1999, a set of questions has been added to the EU-LFS on a yearly basis. In 2008, the 
ad hoc module examined the labour market situation of migrants and their immediate 
descendants. The recent economic crisis in Europe renders employment and activity data 
from 2008 somewhat dated. Still, without data on acquisition of citizenship and country of 
birth of parents, it would be impossible to distinguish first generation migrants (individu-
als who are themselves and both of their parents born outside of country of destination) 
from second-generation migrants and citizens born abroad to native parents. Therefore, 
despite the recent and significant changes in the economic climate in Europe, we see the 
2008 data as preferable to more recent EU-LFS data that conflates several categories of 
foreign-born and non-citizen respondents. 
Eurostat has no 
responsibility for 
the results and 
conclusions which 
are those of the 
researchers.
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soCIAL ExCLusIon & LIvInG CondITIons
Indicators in the social exclusion and living conditions categories are derived from the 
2008 cross-sectional European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC) instrument. EU-SILC data are not gathered from a single survey or common ques-
tionnaire. Data are gathered based on harmonized lists of target variables to be transmit-
ted to Eurostat; common guidelines and procedures; common concepts and classifications 
aimed at maximizing comparability of the information produced. EU-SILC brings togeth-
er statistics on income, poverty, social exclusion, housing, labour, education and health 
from the 27 European Union countries and also Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and 
Turkey.
The EU-SILC framework stipulates that samples must be selected based on probability 
sampling and that samples should be nationally representative of the population residing 
in private households in the territory of the countries, regardless of language, citizenship 
or legal residence status. All household members are surveyed, but only those aged 16 and 
above are interviewed. About 130,000 households and 270,000 persons aged 16 and more 
are interviewed in the European Union countries. EU-SILC data are collected primarily 
through personal interviews, but telephone interviews and self-administered question-
naires are also used as modes of data collection. 
EU-SILC 2008 cross-sectional data were used for analysis in order to allow comparison 
with the indicators of labour force participation from the same year. 
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What We aLL have in common: 
setting a standard for the 
acQuisition of nationaLity by 
immigrants and their descendants
The partners in this project are setting a standard for assessing and improving national 
legislation and policies on the acquisition of nationality for immigrants and their descend-
ants. This standard builds on the decade-long comparative research agenda, currently un-
der the auspices of the EUDO-Citizenship Observatory as well as the issues raised in the 
ten national stakeholder roundtables. This consortium’s latest project (ACIT) demonstrat-
ed what are the major legal and procedural opportunities and obstacles across Europe for 
the acquisition and loss of nationality, particularly the ordinary naturalisation procedure.
Over the course of the research, these standards have been developed in response to na-
tional laws and practices. Many national legal and procedural obstacles to the acquisition 
of nationality exist across Europe for immigrants and their descendants. In practice, Euro-
stat’s naturalisation rates show that every year only two out of 100 foreign residents natu-
ralise in the EU (Sartori 2012).7 As a 2008 survey shows, just one in three foreign-born 
immigrants residing in the EU had by then acquired citizenship through naturalisation. 
Outside Europe, the world’s traditional countries of immigration, such Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand and the United States, have made naturalisation central to their integration 
strategies. In Northwest Europe, decades after the arrival of so-called ‘guest workers’, many 
governments have recognised that their nations are countries of immigration and passed 
major reforms creating clearer pathways to naturalisation, some form of territorial birth-
right entitlement to citizenship and have broadly accepted dual citizenship. This process 
is now repeating itself in Europe’s newer countries of immigration. These opportunities 
for immigrants to become full citizens and voters are currently being challenged by some 
political parties across Europe. Since the increasing changes and politicisation of these 
laws affects the legal status and lives of millions of people across Europe, a comparative 
standard is necessary to analyse and improve national laws and procedures on the acquisi-
tion of nationality by immigrants and their descendants. At present, the main European 
legal instrument, the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Nationality, sets a maximum 
residence requirement of 10 years for naturalisation, prohibits discrimination between 
citizens by birth and by naturalisation, lists exhaustively the grounds for withdrawal of 
nationality and commits signatory states to accept dual citizenship when it emerges at 
birth. Beyond these and other important standards, the Convention says little about the 
acquisition of nationality from an immigrant integration perspective. 
The EU faces a three major citizenship policy challenges. First, Member States regulate 
access to EU citizenship under their own citizenship laws and want to preserve this privi-
lege as an expression of their sovereignty and self-determination. Second, the citizens of 
Member States are also citizens of the European Union who enjoy free movement and 
admission rights in all other Member States. The EU has therefore an interest that Mem-
ber States’ policies on the acquisition and loss of citizenship take into account the gen-
eral principles of EU law, specifically proportionality and effective remedy. Member States 
7  See: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-12-045/EN/KS-SF-12-045-EN.PDF, p. 2.
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have an interest in coordinating access to EU citizenship in such a way that no state can 
subvert immigration control of other Member States through offering EU citizenship to 
large extraterritorial populations. Third, the EU and its Member States have a common 
interest in promoting full integration of long-term immigrants and their descendants 
through naturalisation and ius soli, in order to prevent that settled foreigners are deprived 
of secure residence and political representation and to promote a sense of shared member-
ship among both native and immigrant origin populations. 
The basic right of Member States to self-determination in matters of citizenship sets limits 
to any political initiative for coordinating or harmonising citizenship laws and policies. 
The link between national and EU citizenship has, however, already resulted in significant 
EU law constraints on withdrawal of citizenship8 and political protests against some Mem-
ber States’ policies of facilitated naturalisation to ethnic kin populations or descendants 
of former citizens in non-EU states.9 Finally, promoting the integration of non-EU im-
migrants has become an EU competence and since 1999 EU documents have consistently 
emphasized that access to citizenship is an important step in this integration process.10 
National ministers responsible for integration did agree in the 1999 Tampere Presidency 
Conclusions that naturalisation should be part of their strategies on comparable rights and 
responsibilities. On this basis, the Commission, under Justice and Home Affairs Commis-
sioner Vitorino, provided some basic guidance in its 2003 Communication on immigra-
tion, integration and employment: 
On the premise that it is desirable that immigrants become citizens, it is reasonable to relate 
access to citizenship to the length of time they have been living in the country concerned 
and to apply different principles for 1st and 2nd/3rd generation immigrants. For the latter, 
citizenship laws should provide automatic or semi-automatic access whereas it is reason-
able to require the first generation to make a formal application for citizenship. Naturalisa-
tion should be rapid, secure and non-discretionary. States may require a period of residence, 
knowledge of the language and take into account any criminal record. In any case, criteria 
for naturalisation should be clear, precise and objective. Administrative discretion should be 
delimited and subject to judicial control. 
In 2010, EU Member States made ‘the share of immigrants that have acquired citizen-
ship’ into an EU integration indicator, because the EU Common Basic Principles consider 
that immigrants’ participation in the democratic process supports their integration and 
enhances their sense of belonging. Information exchange has been requested by Member 
States and organised through the European Migration Network, research projects and the 
European Commission’s technical seminars as part of its Handbook on Integration and 
Integration Indicators.
Although the three challenges point in different directions, citizenship policies can be 
reformed in such a way that the each of the legitimate interests involved is taken into 
8  See the CJEU judgment in Rottmann.
9  See, for example, EUDO CITIZENSHIP reports and news.
10  European Council, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 Presidency Conclusions, Tampere, 
Finland; Council of the European Union (2007), Conclusions on the strengthening of integration policies in 
the European Union by promoting unity in diversity, 2807th Justice and Home Affairs Council, 12 and 13 June 
2007, Luxembourg;; European Commission (2010) Handbook on Integration for policy-makers and practition-
ers: third edition, Brussels, Belgium; European Ministerial Conference on Integration (2010) Declaration and 
Annex, 15 and 16 April 2010, Zaragoza, Spain.
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account. We indicate below only the main goals of such reforms and support the argument 
with evidence from the ACIT research and stakeholder roundtables, while leaving open 
the procedures how they could be promoted or achieved through new actions taken by the 
European Commission, European Parliament, and Council of Europe. These standards 
focus on the acquisition of nationality for immigrants. Issues of loss of citizenship and 
statelessness will be addressed by future EUDO-Citizenship research projects.
The first section of this standard is an introduction that explains why the acquisition of 
nationality matters for integration. It also explains how countries can diagnose and rem-
edy the causes of low naturalisation rates. The second section provides the core stand-
ards for policies and procedures on the acquisition of nationality by immigrants and their 
descendants. This standard assists lawmakers and practitioners to improve the law and 
procedure in their respective country. In the third section, each of the standards is further 
elaborated in an explanatory report in terms of the benefits for immigrants, for the state 
and for society. 
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pArT 1: why ThE ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy 
mATTErs for InTEGrATIon
 
Immigrants who want to settle down in their country of residence have an interest in be-
coming its citizens. National citizenship is the highest standard of equal treatment because 
immigrants become citizens with all the same rights, same responsibilities and same voice 
in a democracy. Even where immigrants enjoy secure residence and similar social rights as 
national citizens, as is the case with EU citizen residing in other Member States, it is only 
when they become full citizens that political parties and representative institutions will 
take into account their interests and opinions into account. For third country nationals, 
naturalisation facilitates integration through securing their residence, full access to em-
ployment, free movement within the EU and civic rights and responsibilities at all levels. 
Naturalisation encourages the public to recognise immigrants as their equals and develop 
together a new shared sense of belonging to the country. Therefore, the state and the pub-
lic also have democratic, social and economic interests in facilitating the acquisition of 
citizenship by the settled foreign population, especially by the new generation born in the 
country.
Residence-based naturalisation is part of a broader strategy to secure equal rights and 
opportunities for all residents in society. Naturalisation is not the end of the integration 
process for immigrants. It reduces—but does not eliminate—discrimination or exclu-
sion based on ethnic, religious, or national origin, which must be remedied through anti-
discrimination policies and political participation. Nor is naturalisation the only route to 
equal treatment. Instead, facilitating naturalisation is a complementary strategy. In fact, the 
European countries with more inclusive naturalisation policies and higher naturalisation 
rates also tend to grant foreigners more equal rights, including voting rights at the local 
level. Naturalisation not only secures equal rights for naturalised immigrants. It also helps 
to improve for the situation of foreign residents. Citizens of immigrant origin can exercise 
equal power in elections and politics at national level, where the rights of foreigners are 
regulated. The opportunity to naturalise is a guarantee that the electorate and elected of-
ficials consider the rights and opportunities of all settled residents within the population. 
Facilitating naturalisation is especially important for the integration of foreigners from 
developing countries. As documented in the CITACQ section of this report, immigrants 
from low-or-medium developed countries have a greater motivation and incentive to natu-
ralise. Naturalisation also has the greatest effects on the socio-economic and civic integra-
tion of persons from developing countries. In contrast, immigrants from highly developed 
countries are generally likely to naturalise only after a longer period of residence in the 
country or marriage to one of its citizens. Research shows that inclusive naturalisation poli-
cies improve people’s likelihood to naturalise, especially for immigrants from developing 
countries. The more of a country’s immigrant population comes from developing coun-
tries, the greater is the importance of naturalisation for integration.
Facilitating naturalisation is also important in countries with long-settled foreign popula-
tions. The longer immigrants live in the country, the more able and willing they are to natu-
ralise. Still, restrictive policies make it longer and harder for even long-settled foreigners to 
become citizens. The long-term exclusion of foreigners from national citizenship reinforc-
es their socio-economic exclusion. It discourages the development of a new shared sense 
of belonging. The country’s legitimacy as a democracy is also undermined by this major 
democratic deficit at national level and in cities and regions with large foreign populations. 
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In addition, newcomers with a clear long-term future in the country have a greater interest 
in naturalisation. Immigrants’ motivation to naturalise is partly influenced by their reason 
for migration. For example, reuniting family members and beneficiaries of international 
protection naturalise more often and more quickly. These groups are not only likely to set-
tle in the country. They also have a claim to facilitated naturalisation, due to their family 
ties to citizens or immigrants who are eligible for naturalisation or because of the need 
to provide a new effective citizenship to refugees and other beneficiaries of international 
protection. In contrast, immigrant workers and international students often take a differ-
ent and longer path to first qualify and then decide to naturalise. The larger is a country’s 
population of family immigrants or beneficiaries of international protection, the greater is 
the need for facilitated naturalisation.
Favourable conditions for socio-economic integration also encourage naturalisation. Es-
pecially for immigrants from less developed countries stable jobs, higher education and 
mastery of the country’s language make them more likely to apply for naturalisation. This 
pattern is observed across European countries, no matter how restrictive or liberal the 
country’s naturalisation policy is. The more European societies are able to provide immi-
grants with jobs, higher education and language skills, the more likely these immigrants 
are to become citizens of these countries. The more European societies fail to provide im-
migrants with the opportunities and skills for socio-economic integration, the more im-
migrants will be excluded from citizenship. Even greater problems of exclusion are created 
by countries with significant socio-economic integration problems when they impose re-
strictive naturalisation requirements. Due to their socio-economic status and conditions, 
a large share of applicants will not be able to meet demanding employment, education or 
language requirements. 
Lastly, facilitating naturalisation is important because it is one of the few areas where poli-
cies have a clear impact on integration. Research shows that the more inclusive is a coun-
try’s naturalisation policy for immigrants, the more often and more quickly immigrants 
become citizens (Dronkers and Vink 2012; Vink, Prokic-Breuer, Dronkers 2013).11 Ac-
ceptance of dual citizenship by countries of residence and origin also increases naturali-
sation. Following naturalisation, citizenship boosts the levels of employment and politi-
cal participation for various immigrant groups, according to several national studies and 
emerging international research, including from the OECD.12
For all these reasons, countries of immigration should scrutinize the legal and procedural 
obstacles within their policies on the acquisition of nationality for immigrants and their 
descendants. This document’s proposed standards would remove many of these obstacles 
and facilitate the procedure for immigrants and their descendants. The standards address 
the acquisition of nationality from the perspective of integration, which, in this case, con-
cerns foreigners legally resident on the country’s territory. The objectives are equal treat-
ment, equal participation and a shared sense of belonging for all persons settled in the 
country. 
11  Dronkers, J. and M.P. Vink (2012), “Explaining Access to Citizenship in Europe: How Policies Affect Natu-
ralisation Rates”, European Union Politics, 13(3): 390–412.
12  OECD (2011). Naturalisation: A Passport for the Better Integration of Immigrants? OECD, Paris. Bevelander, 
P. and D.J. DeVoretz (Eds) (2008), The Economics of Citizenship. Malmo University, Holmbergs, Malmo. Bev-
elander, P. and R. Pendakur (2011) Voting and Social Inclusion in Sweden. International Migration, 49(4). 
Steinhardt, M. F. (2012). Does Citizenship Matter? The Economic Impact of Naturalizations in Germany. La-
bour Economics, 19: 813-823.
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In a liberal democracy, the legal requirements for the acquisition of citizenship by immi-
grants should be based on what all citizens have in common. Most citizens were born or 
live in the country. As pupils, they were taught one of its official languages and, in some 
school systems, basic facts about its political system and constitution. All must respect the 
law and their civic responsibilities. Immigrants who fulfil these common criteria deserve 
to be publically recognised as full and equal citizens. Countries can only reasonably ex-
pect of applicants for naturalisation what it expects of its own citizens. Legal requirements 
based on what all citizens are expected to have in common are more legitimate, propor-
tionate and effective for the integration of immigrants and can be met by them over time. 
As a result, immigrants who want to become national citizens will be encouraged and able 
to develop and demonstrate their effective links to the country.
The situation of second and third generations born in the country differs fundamentally 
from that of first generation immigrants. The former share with native citizens the fact 
of birth in the territory. They grow up in the same society and – unless groups of immi-
grant origin are segregated from mainstream society – share similar childhood experi-
ences. Asking them to apply for naturalisation under similar conditions as first generation 
adult immigrants denies their belonging by birth and socialisation, stigmatizes them as 
foreigners and breeds resentment against the institutions of what is their home country. 
A significant number of European states have introduced ius soli for second and third 
generations of immigrant origin for that reason. Reasonable concerns have been raised 
that unconditional ius soli, as it exists today in the US or Canada, wrongly attributes citi-
zenship to children accidentally born in the territory to tourists or provides problematic 
incentives for pregnant mothers to give birth in an EU Member State in order to benefit 
from derivative residence rights for parental caregivers under EU law. These concerns 
have been taken into account by making ius soli acquisition conditional upon prior legal 
residence of a parent or by delaying birthright acquisition to some time after birth. Ius soli 
has a particularly strong impact on how immigration is perceived in the wider society. If 
the children of foreigners are citizens from birth, they are seen as members by birth just 
as native citizens. Conversely, in countries without ius soli provisions, the status of being 
a foreigner is transmitted across generations, which supports the perception that immi-
grants do not belong.
Many participants in national debates about ius soli wrongly assume that countries need 
to choose between ius sanguinis and ius soli. In fact, all European countries with ius soli 
provisions also offer descent-based citizenship to second generations born abroad. Sec-
ond generations born to citizens abroad have a claim to their parents’ citizenship just as 
second generations born in the country have a claim to that country’s citizenship. The 
result of combining ius sanguinis with ius soli is thus dual citizenship for those children 
who have strong ties to a parental country of origin as well as to their country of birth.
The proposed principle for inclusive birthright entitlement to citizenship does not on its 
own address the situation of children who immigrate as minors together with or in some 
cases even separated from their parents. This so-called generation 1.5 shares most of the 
experiences of the second generation but remains often excluded from access to citizen-
ship until the age of majority in ius soli regimes. Some countries offer therefore strong 
entitlements to naturalisation under facilitated conditions to minor children who have 
lived in the country for some time. The Swedish law, which offers unconditional access to 
citizenship to minors who have lived in Sweden for five years, is exemplary in this regard.
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pArT 2: sTAndArd for ThE ACquIsITIon of 
nATIonALITy by ImmIGrAnTs And ThEIr dEsCEndAnTs
 
1. ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy bAsEd on bIrThrIGhT or so-
CIALIsATIon
1.1. A person acquires nationality at birth if:
The person is born on the territory of the country provided one of the parents has resided in 
the country with any legal residence permit for several years prior to the person’s birth. The 
period of required prior parental residence should be the same as that required for naturalisa-
tion of first generation immigrants and should not exceed five out of the past years.
2. nATurALIsATIon of mInor ChILdrEn 
A person of minor age has the right to acquire nationality:
2.1. if he or she has completed five years of continuous residence or altogether five years of 
compulsory education in the country and is legally residing in the country with any legal 
residence permit at the time of application;
2.2. if one of her parents is a citizen by birth or naturalisation and the natural or adopted 
child has legally resided in the country for at a required period that should not exceed three 
years;
2.3. if a foreign citizen parent acquires nationality by naturalisation and the natural or 
adopted child has legally resided in the country for a required period that should not exceed 
three years;
3. ordInAry nATurALIsATIon
A person has the right to be naturalised as a citizen if he or she meets the following legal 
requirements.
3.1. LEGAL RESIDENCE
3.1.1. The person has resided in the country with any legal residence permit for a period not 
exceeding five out of the past six years prior to the application.
3.1.2. If the applicant is a stateless person, recognised refugee, or beneficiary of subsidiary 
protection, the requirement of legal residence is fulfilled if the person has legally resided in 
the country for a required period not exceeding three out of the past four years prior to the 
application.
3.1.3. If the applicant is the spouse or registered partner of a citizen under national law, the 
requirement of legal residence is fulfilled if the applicant has been married or in a registered 
partnership for a required period not exceeding three years prior to application and has le-
gally resided in the country in the same household as the citizen partner for at least one year 
prior to the application.
3.2. LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE
3.2.1. The person has demonstrated their willingness to learn one of the country’s official lan-
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guages to the level provided in courses entirely or largely funded by the state. 
3.2.2. This requirement does not apply to:
• persons over the age of 65
• persons with relevant mental and physical disabilities, as defined in national law 
3.3. CIVIC RESPONISBILITIES
3.3.1. The person fulfils the same civic responsibilities and good character requirements as 
other residents or citizens of the country required by other laws (i.e. for voting rights, public 
office, public sector employment). 
3.3.2. The person has demonstrated a willingness to learn facts on civics or citizenship if this 
is required of all pupils in a dedicated civics or citizenship subject in the country’s compulsory 
education curriculum. Naturalisation applicants fulfil the same requirement and benefit from 
the same support and exemptions as provided in the state civics or citizenship curriculum. 
3.3.3. This requirement does not apply to:
• persons over the age of 65
• persons with relevant mental and physical disabilities, as defined in national law 
3.4. NO SERIOUS THREAT TO PUBLIC POLICY OR PUBLIC SECURITY
Naturalisation may be denied if an applicant
3.4.1. is a serious threat to public security or
3.4.2. has committed crimes punishable with a prison sentence of five years or more. After a 
sentence has been served, a foreign citizen may only be further excluded from naturalisation 
if citizen would under the same conditions be excluded from voting or holding public office. 
3.5. COST
3.5.1. The total fee for foreigners to apply for naturalisation and receive the nationality title 
shall not exceed the fee for citizens to apply for and receive a passport. 
3.5.2. The fee is waived for persons in households with an income below the poverty line, as 
defined in national social law. A person’s financial or economic circumstances shall not be an 
obstacle to the acquisition of nationality.
4. muLTIpLE nATIonALITy
The country does not prevent multiple nationality: 
4.1. through any requirement of renunciation of a foreign nationality as a condition for natu-
ralisation, 
4.2. through any ground of withdrawal of nationality in case of voluntary acquisition of a 
foreign nationality, or 
4.3. through any requirement of renunciation of a foreign nationality acquired at birth 
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5. nATurALIsATIon of pErsons wITh spECIAL EffECTIvE LInKs 
To ThE CounTry
5.1. Nothing prevents countries from adopting more favourable conditions for the naturalisa-
tion of other categories of persons with specific effective links to the country or a citizen of the 
country, for example by extending naturalisation to spouses, descendants of former citizens, 
other family members, reacquisition by former citizens.
6. proCEdurEs for ThE ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy
The following provisions are respected by national authorities and monitored by the National 
Ombudsman:
6.1. DOCUMENTATION FOR ORDINARY NATURALISATION 
6.1.1. An applicant’s legal identity and residence in the country is documented within the 
application procedure through a legalised photocopy of their current residence permit and 
assessed by the state on the basis of its official records. 
6.1.2. A decision rejecting an application may not be based solely on the fact that documenta-
tion is lacking from the applicant’s country of origin or a third country. 
6.1.3. The willingness to learn the official language is documented by the applicant through 
any legal means as part of the application or procedure, including a certificate of partici-
pation in a state-subsidised language course or test (including any required civics test), or 
completion of secondary or university education in the official language. The requirement is 
assessed by the state on the basis of these documents.
6.1.4. The respect of civic responsibilities is assessed by the state on the basis of official state 
records and may be documented within the application through any legal document gener-
ally required of citizens (e.g. state-provided good character certificates). If required in the 
compulsory education system, the learning of facts about civics or citizenship is proven by 
the applicant through any legal means or certificate as part of the application or procedure, 
including participation in a state-subsidised course or test or completion of the general civ-
ics/citizenship curriculum within the country’s compulsory or adult education system. The 
requirement is assessed by the state on the basis of these documents.
6.1.5. The criminal record is assessed by the state on the basis of its official records. The 
threat to public security is assessed by the state on the basis of information at its disposal. 
When taking a final decision, the state shall consider the severity or type of offence against 
public security, or the danger that emanates from the person concerned, while also having 
proper regard to the duration of residence and to the existence of links with the country of 
residence.
6.2. A PUBLIC SERVICE WELCOMING CITIZENS-TO-BE
6.2.1. Authorities inform foreigners about the naturalisation requirements, procedure and 
benefits through free information services, websites and materials. The state supports an op-
tional service to check if the application and documentation is complete.
6.2.2. In addition, authorities promote naturalisation among foreigners and the general 
public.
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6.2.3. Applicants have multiple ways to send in their application both directly to the deciding 
authority and indirectly through several types of local services.
6.2.4. One specialised nationality unit examines the application, checks that all documenta-
tion is correct and makes the final decision. 
6.2.5. Authorities check each requirement on the basis of the required documentation and 
their publically available interpretative guidelines. The state eliminates the discretion of au-
thorities as far as possible in order to guarantee that naturalisation is a legal entitlement for 
all persons who meet the legal requirements. 
 
6.2.6. Applicants have the right to be informed on the progress of the procedure. 
6.2.7. Authorities shall give written notification of the decision as soon as possible and in any 
event no later than six months from the date on which the application was lodged. The time 
limit may be extended in exceptional circumstances linked to the complexity of the examina-
tion of the application. If no decision is taken by the end of this period, the application shall 
be considered as approved.
6.3. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
6.3.1. Reasons shall be given for any decision rejecting an application. The notification shall 
specify the specific ground(s) of rejection, specific reasons and evidence for each ground, the 
review and appeal procedures available and the time within which the applicant may request 
a review or lodge an appeal.
6.3.2. Applicants have the right to an administrative review and an independent judicial 
appeal. The review and appeal can cover both the decision to reject the application as well 
as any assessment required for naturalisation. Appellants have equal access to the legal aid 
provided in the country for general appeal procedures.
6.3.3. National courts have the power to examine both procedural and substantive aspects 
and change the decision in merit. 
6.4. EQUAL TREATMENT AND RECOGNITION OF NEW CITIZENS
6.4.1. Authorities guarantee the equal treatment of all applicants within the procedure across 
the national territory.
 
6.4.2. The procedure does not contain distinctions or include any practice which amounts 
to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour, national or ethnic origin, na-
tionality, age, disability, or sexual orientation. Respect of this provision is monitored by the 
national equality agency.
6.4.3. Authorities solemnly recognise the conferral of nationality upon naturalised citizens 
through whatever means are appropriate in the country.
6.4.4. Authorities facilitate as much as possible the registration of new citizen voters and any 
of other new civic responsibilities conferred by national and EU citizenship.
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pArT 3: ExpLAnATory rEporT for ThE sTAndArd for 
ThE ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy by ImmIGrAnTs And 
ThEIr dEsCEndAnTs
 
1. ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy bAsEd on bIrThrIGhT or so-
CIALIsATIon
1.1. A person acquires nationality at birth if:
The person is born on the territory of the country provided one of the parents has resided 
in the country with any legal residence permit for at least a total of five out of the past six 
years prior to the person’s birth.
1.2. A person has the right to acquire nationality if:
The person completed five years of compulsory education in the country by the age of 18 
and is legally residing in the country with any legal residence permit at the time of applica-
tion.
2. nATurALIsATIon of mInor ChILdrEn
2.1. If the parent of a minor child acquires nationality, the minor child acquires nationality 
at the same time.
Most citizens of a country were born and live within its territory. Being born in the coun-
try is often the most important characteristic that citizens cite to define what it means to 
be a citizen of their country. The descendants of immigrants—born or educated in the 
country just like any other child—have a strong claim to equal recognition as citizens. 
Children born or educated in the country have effective links to the country. A child born 
in the country is very likely to grow up there, especially if one of the parents has been 
a legal resident for several years. These children must attend school, learn the country’s 
language and learn everything else expected of other children. They probably will know 
no country better and no other country will shape them as much. The opportunities and 
challenges that they face in life are very different from their parents and much more like 
other children raised in the country in similar social circumstances. This country is theirs. 
Foreign-born adults eligible for naturalisation must prove their effective links to the coun-
try. If they choose to naturalise, their children should also have the right to become citi-
zens in order to preserve family unity and the best interests of the child. The reasons to 
naturalise for parents are not the same as for their children born or educated in the coun-
try. Parents chose to immigrate and become foreigners, but their children do not choose 
where their parents immigrate or where they are born. These members of the ‘second gen-
eration’ are not immigrants in their own country. Therefore, the ordinary naturalisation 
procedure for their parents is not appropriate for their children. 
Citizenship at birth recognises the second generation as full and equal citizens and encour-
ages them to develop a full sense of self and belonging. All children born in the country, 
with and without an immigrant background, are encouraged to see and treat each other 
as equals and develop together a shared sense of solidarity and belonging to their country.
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Immigrant children educated in the country (the so-called 1.5 generation) also have a 
special entitlement to citizenship. These children will have a future in the country, just like 
other young adults in the country. The right to the citizenship recognises their achieve-
ment and provides them with the same status, opportunities and responsibilities as other 
adult citizens.
3. ordInAry nATurALIsATIon
A person has the right to be naturalised as a citizen if he or she meets the following legal 
requirements.
A recent trend in citizenship law in Europe, the creation of a conditional right to ordi-
nary naturalisation builds greater consensus and trust in the naturalisation requirements 
among the general public and potential applicants for naturalisation. This entitlement 
demonstrates that the government believes in these requirements as meaningful signs of 
immigrants’ effective links and commitment to the country.
The conditional right to naturalisation recognises that immigrants who meet the legal re-
quirements are full and equal citizens and encourages them to develop a full sense of self 
and belonging. It changes the public perception of immigrants by considering them from 
the very start as potential future citizens. Most importantly, a legal entitlement to naturali-
sation signals that it is not only the applicant who has an individual interest in acquiring 
citizenship, but also the state that has an interest that immigrants who qualify take up the 
offer of full and equal citizenship. 
3.1. LEGAL RESIDENCE
3.1.1. The person has resided in the country with any legal residence permit for at least a 
total of five out of the past six years prior to the application.
3.1.2. If the applicant is a stateless person, recognised refugee, or beneficiary of subsidiary 
protection, the requirement of legal residence is fulfilled if the person has legally resided in 
the country for at least one year prior to the application.
3.1.3. If the applicant is the spouse or registered partner of a citizen under national law, the 
requirement of legal residence is fulfilled if the applicant has been married or in a registered 
partnership for at least three years prior to application and has legally resided in the coun-
try for at least one year prior to the application.
6.1. DOCUMENTATION FOR ORDINARY NATURALISATION
6.1.1. An applicant’s legal identity and residence in the country is documented within the 
application through a legalised photocopy of their current residence permit and assessed by 
the state on the basis of its official records. 
6.1.2. A decision rejecting an application may not be based solely on the fact that documen-
tation is lacking from the applicant’s country of origin or a third country. 
After five years of legal residence, all foreign-born adults should be able to naturalise 
if they can meet the legal requirements. This threshold is meant to include all people 
residing in the country for several years. By agreeing to five years for eligibility for EC 
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long-term residence (2003/109/EC) EU Member States have acknowledged that after this 
period a person has put down roots in the country. After five years, many immigrants will 
have had the time to develop effective links in society and decide whether to make a life-
long commitment to the country through acquisition of its citizenship. The requirement of 
‘five out of the past six years’ is easy-to-understand and flexible. A flexible requirement can 
correct for small interruptions in legal residence due to errors in immigration and general 
administrative procedures. Interruptions in legal residence are allowed for 365 days (con-
tinuous or non-continuous) over the six years prior to the application. It also allows for 
the international mobility that naturally comes with transnational families and businesses. 
Without this flexibility, an interruption of a few days or months could delay an applicant’s 
effective waiting period until eligibility for naturalisation from five years to up to ten years. 
These minor interruptions in legal residence are not a strong enough argument to reject an 
applicant who meets the legal requirements to become a citizen.
The residence requirement should be shorter for certain categories of immigrants that 
quickly develop special links with the country. Refugees and beneficiaries of international 
protection are entirely dependent on a “host state” for their protection. The spouses and 
partners of nationals also have a greater claim to citizenship because they have committed 
to building their life together with one of the country’s citizens. For these groups, facilitat-
ing naturalisation helps uphold a country’s commitment to international protection and 
the respect for family life. These and other groups should benefit from facilitated naturali-
sation, as suggested also in the Council of Europe’s 1997 Convention on Nationality. 
Applicants establish their identity and residence through documentation from the coun-
try of residence or alternative means in the country. A legalised photocopy of the national 
ID or permit can be included in the application. It would be both unnecessary and un-
fair to reject an applicant only because they cannot provide documentation from a third 
country (i.e. birth certificate or passport). Firstly, authorities have already confirmed the 
applicant’s identity through the immigration or asylum procedure. Their identity card or 
residence permit in the country is sufficient proof of their identity. Secondly, it is some-
times impossible, unreasonable, or expensive for applicants to obtain documentation from 
their country of origin, depending on the geographical distance, their personal and family 
links, the functioning of the state administration, their reason of migration or their fear of 
persecution or violence.
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3.2. LANGUAGE KNOWLEDGE
3.2.1. The person has demonstrated their willingness to learn one of the country’s official 
languages to the level provided in courses entirely or largely funded by the state. 
3.2.2. This requirement does not apply to:
• persons over the age of 65
• persons with related mental and physical disabilities, as defined in national social law
6.1. DOCUMENTATION FOR ORDINARY NATURALISATION
6.1.3. The willingness to learn the official language is documented by the applicant through 
any legal means as part of the application or procedure, including a certificate of partici-
pation in a state-subsidised language course or test (including any required civics test), or 
completion of secondary or university education in the official language. The requirement 
is assessed by the state on the basis of these documents.
Almost all citizens of a country can express themselves in at least one of its official languag-
es. All children in the country will learn the language in the country’s schools. Societies that 
invest in language learning for first generation adults are serious about their goals to share 
a common language and improve social cohesion. Most applicants are able in some way to 
demonstrate their willingness to learn the language. 
A person’s language abilities are related to their personal circumstances. It is reasonable to 
expect applicants for naturalisation to obtain the level of language proficiency provided in 
state-subsidised language courses. Free or means-tested courses, study guides and means of 
assessment must be available for all immigrants who want to become fluent in the language. 
When the naturalisation requirement matches the level of state language support, natu-
ralisation may work as an incentive to language learning to the benefit of immigrants and 
society at large. This approach will make it easier for applicants with the required language 
level to document this and easier for the administration to check this. Effective language 
support would successfully help all applicants to obtain the skills they need to naturalise 
and fulfil their civic rights and responsibilities as citizens. 
In contrast, countries undermine their objectives for linguistic integration when the level 
required for naturalisation is higher than the level provided by the state. Language require-
ments are then used as an obstacle to naturalisation and inclusion. Without public courses, 
many applicants wishing to learn the language will be unable to demonstrate this willing-
ness, due to their economic or social circumstances.
Legal rights to exemptions exist for people, who, through no fault of their own, are unable 
to learn the language or demonstrate their knowledge, for example through a written test. 
These people include the elderly and persons with mental and physical disabilities that af-
fect their ability to learn or pass tests.
51aCIt
3.3. CIVIC RESPONSIBILITIES
3.3.1. The person fulfils the same civic responsibilities and good character requirements as 
other residents or citizens of the country required by other Acts (i.e. for voting rights, public 
office, public sector employment). 
3.3.2. The person has demonstrated their willingness to learn facts on civics or citizenship 
if this is required of all pupils in a dedicated civics or citizenship subject in the country’s 
compulsory education curriculum. Naturalisation applicants fulfil the same requirement 
and benefit from the same support and exemptions as provided in the state civics or citi-
zenship curriculum. 
3.3.3. This requirement does not apply to:
• persons over the age of 65
• persons with related mental and physical disabilities, as defined in national social law
6.1. DOCUMENTATION FOR ORDINARY NATURALISATION 
6.1.4. The respect of civic responsibilities is assessed by the state on the basis of their official 
state records and may be documented within the application through any legal document 
generally required of citizens (e.g. state-provided good character certificates). If required 
in the compulsory education system, the learning of facts about civics or citizenship is also 
proven by the applicant through any legal means or certificate as part of the application or 
procedure, including participation in a state-subsidised course or test or completion of the 
general civics/citizenship curriculum within the country’s compulsory or adult education 
system. The requirement is assessed by the state on the basis of these documents.
Foreign-born adults should fulfil the same civic responsibilities and good character re-
quirements required of other residents or citizens of the country for the acquisition or 
maintenance of their civic rights. Countries have different definitions of good character 
and unacceptable civic conduct. Specifically, civic requirements may exist for all residents 
or citizens to acquire or maintain their voting rights, publically elected office, or public 
sector employment. When the same civic requirements required of all residents or citizens 
are also required for applicants for naturalisation, the naturalisation procedure may be 
more meaningful and reasonable for both the general public and eligible immigrants. 
Additional civic knowledge requirements only make sense in countries where civic facts 
are required common knowledge for all citizens. The European Commission’s 2012 Eury-
dice report on “Citizenship Education in Europe” found that only 17 EU Member States 
require that pupils in compulsory education (ISCED 1 or 2) attend civics or citizenship 
education as a compulsory separate subject or module in a discrete teaching bloc. The 
place reserved to civics and citizenship education in the compulsory education reflects 
the importance attached to the subject area. The number of hours dedicated to this sub-
ject varies significantly across countries and changes regularly. Depending on the country, 
students’ marks in civics or citizenship education may or may not be taken into account 
for students to transition to the next level of education. The relevant European standard 
in the development of such curricula is the Council of Europe Charter’s on Education for 
Democratic Citizenship, adopted by its 47 member states in the framework of Recom-
mendation CM/Rec(2010)7.
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Beyond a separate civic or citizenship subject or module in some countries, civic knowl-
edge is not required common civic knowledge for a country’s citizens. Indeed, surveys 
suggest that there are few things that all adult citizens know about their country’s history 
or civic institutions. Given the limited role of civic knowledge in public life, it is only 
meaningful to expect foreign-born adults to learn what is taught to all pupils if there is 
an explicit civics or citizenship subject in compulsory education. The same requirement 
(participation and/or assessment), support and exemptions should apply for all applicants 
for naturalisation as for pupils in the compulsory civics or citizenship curriculum. Free 
or means-tested courses, study guides and means of assessment must be available for all 
immigrants eligible to naturalise. As a result, the naturalisation procedure will be more 
efficient because applicants can use the same materials from the compulsory or adult edu-
cation system. This civics or citizenship curriculum will also be more relevant in society 
for all persons, whatever their background. Effective state-subsidised civics courses may 
be effective if they successfully help immigrants to obtain the information they need to 
naturalise and subsequently exercise their full civic rights and responsibilities.
3.4. NO SERIOUS THREAT TO PUBLIC POLICY OR PUBLIC SECURITY
3.4.1. The person is not a serious threat to public security.
3.4.2. The person has a clean criminal record in the country. 
3.4.3. A person who served a prison sentence of five years or more in the country must have 
legally resided in the country for at least a total of five out of the past six years since the date 
of completion of their sentence or probation.
6.1. DOCUMENTATION FOR ORDINARY NATURALISATION
6.1.5. The criminal record is assessed by the state on the basis of its official records. The 
threat to public security is assessed by the state on the basis of information at its disposal. 
When taking a final decision, the state shall consider the severity or type of offence against 
public security, or the danger that emanates from the person concerned, while also having 
proper regard to the duration of residence and to the existence of links with the country of 
residence.
 
While there is no link between crime prevention and naturalisation policy, one of the 
state’s core duties is to secure peace and security for its citizens and residents. It is against 
public interest to naturalise people in criminal proceedings or under investigation as seri-
ous threats to public security. The reason is that naturalisation would grant these suspects 
the state’s diplomatic protection, protection from deportation as well as access to public 
office and jobs exercising public authority. Such an assessment is also required by the EU’s 
family reunification (2003/86/EC) and long-term residence directives (2003/109/EC).
The vast majority of foreign-born adults are law-abiding residents and thus eligible for 
naturalisation. European societies support the rehabilitation of former criminals who 
served their time. If their offense was not a ground for deportation, then former criminals 
should not be permanently barred from naturalisation. They should have the chance to 
prove their commitment to be law-abiding residents. After completion of their sentence 
or probation, they must not commit a crime within an additional five-year-waiting period 
before application for naturalisation. This practice of rehabilitation waiting periods is cur-
rently used for instance in the Nordic countries. 
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The role of state security services in naturalisation is to assess applicants’ criminal record 
and the evidence at its disposal, subject to judicial review. The naturalisation procedure 
should not request applicants to provide documentation from their country of origin or 
other previous countries of residence. Such documentation is both unnecessary and unde-
sirable. Firstly, the state already obtained this information when the applicant was accepted 
for immigration or asylum, at which point the state concluded that the person was not a 
threat to public security or public policy. Secondly, access to the citizenship of a country 
should not be dependent upon the proper functioning of the police and justice systems in 
other countries. 
3.5. COST
3.5.1. The total fee for foreigners to apply for naturalisation and receive the nationality title 
shall not exceed the fee for citizens to apply for and receive a passport. 
3.5.2.  The fee is waived for persons in households with an income below the poverty line, 
as defined in national social law. A person’s financial or economic circumstances shall not 
be an obstacle to the acquisition of nationality. 
Economic resource requirements go against democratic principles. Not all citizens have a 
job, a university degree, or a certain income. Many fall outside the working age population. 
For others, employment rates and education levels vary significantly across and within 
countries, with greater difficulties facing women and youth. Beginning in the nineteenth 
century in Europe, universal suffrage has secured that a person’s socio-economic situation 
was no longer a condition for full and equal citizenship. Enlarging the franchise guaranteed 
that politicians were responsible to improve the socio-economic situation of all, not only 
some privileged citizens whom they represented. Out of respect of these democratic prin-
ciples, today nearly half the European countries studied do not impose economic resource 
requirements for naturalisation.
Economic resource requirements also go against objectives of integration. No evidence 
suggests that more selective naturalisation policies lead to greater socio-economic integra-
tion in society. On the contrary, our research suggests that inclusive policies lead to not only 
to more naturalisations but also a greater impact of naturalisation on male immigrants’ 
employment. Immigrants benefit more from quick naturalisation because they need it the 
most as newcomers. An economic resource requirement for naturalisation would therefore 
be counter-productive because it denies vulnerable foreigners the access to citizenship that 
could improve their economic situation. 
The official fees for the application or issuance of the citizenship title can become de facto 
an economic resource requirement because high fees are tests of a person’s disposable in-
come, especially in times of greater precariousness due to the economic and financial crisis. 
The introduction of fees can significantly affect the naturalisation rate, especially for the 
most vulnerable groups. No one benchmark can be set across all EU countries because 
the fees for general administrative procedures vary across countries due to differences in 
costs of living and administrative cultures. Fees should be reasonable for the acquisition 
and certification of citizenship and fees for administrative or judicial review should not 
be an obstacle, according to the Council of Europe’s Convention on Nationality’s Article 
13, paragraphs 1 and 2. This standard clarifies that fees should be the same as for general 
administrative procedures such as issuance of a passport. Benchmarks for these fees and 
means-tested exemptions ensure that a fee is not a de facto economic resource require-
ment. Any required assessments or documentation should be free or means-tested.
54 aCIt
4. muLTIpLE nATIonALITy
4.1. The country accepts multiple nationality for all citizens through birth or naturalisa-
tion. 
Multiple nationality is a demographic and legal reality that is beneficial not only for natu-
ralising immigrants, but also all types of citizens with effective links to more than one 
country. Many people have effective links with more than one country. EU citizens are 
increasingly mobile and globally connected. One in four EU citizens has close family liv-
ing abroad, while one in twelve marriages is a mixed marriage involving one person born 
abroad. Nearly half of all EU citizens feel some attachment to a country other than their 
country of nationality, because of travel, close friends, or close family abroad. Non-EU im-
migrant populations have grown, settled and created second and third generations.
Effective links with more than one country leads to the need for multiple citizenship for 
both citizens abroad and naturalising immigrants. Most people with effective links to more 
than one country are willing and able to take on the rights and responsibilities of multiple 
citizenship. People are eligible to acquire a citizenship for different reasons and through 
different modes of acquisition, based on their place of birth, marriage, children, place of 
residence, etc. People’s links and responsibilities to one country have little or nothing to do 
with their links and responsibilities to another country. The reasons why dual citizenship 
matters for immigrants are mostly related to the undesirable side effects that losing a citi-
zenship of origin has on their personal, family or other links with their country of origin. 
International research shows that the acceptance of dual citizenship by countries of origin 
and destination removes a significant barrier to naturalisation. 
Increasingly, states around the world see opportunities arising from dual citizenship and 
are able to manage the responsibilities. As countries of emigration, European countries are 
responsible to protect expatriate citizens and their families. Many also maintain cultural 
links with historical diasporas in the world’s traditional countries of immigration. As coun-
tries of immigration, European countries are parts of European-wide and global trends in 
both countries of immigration and countries of origin to accept dual citizenship. Indeed, 
even most governments opposed to dual citizenship cannot avoid it in practice, since it 
often emerges at birth without their knowledge and since renunciation of foreign national-
ity is sometimes impossible or unreasonable, leading to exemptions from the requirement. 
Fears about the acceptance of dual citizenship in public debate have proven unwarranted 
in practice. Hardly any evidence exists that dual citizenship is related to problems of inte-
gration in the country of residence. On the contrary, acceptance of dual citizenship facili-
tates naturalisation, which, in turn, has a positive impact on a person’s economic, social 
and civic integration in their new country. Similarly, experience also shows that dual citi-
zenship very rarely leads to any diplomatic or military conflict. At European level, Council 
of Europe standards and national rules have shifted from preventing to managing multiple 
nationality, for example through bilateral and multilateral agreements on specific issues, 
such as military service and taxation. 
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5. nATurALIsATIon of pErsons wITh spECIAL EffECTIvE LInKs 
To ThE CounTry
5.1. Nothing prevents countries from adopting more favourable conditions for the natu-
ralisation of persons with specific effective links to the country, for example on the basis of 
spousal extension, filial transfer, adopted children, descendants of former citizens, other 
family members, reacquisition, links with specific countries of origin, cultural affinity, refu-
gees, stateless persons, or special achievement.
These standards address the acquisition of nationality from the perspective of integration, 
which, in this case, concerns foreigners legally resident on the country’s territory. This 
does not imply that a state cannot have other modes of acquisition of nationality with 
broader target groups (e.g. persons outside the territory) and with different state objec-
tives, such as the respect of family life, the rule of law, national sovereignty, humanitarian 
commitments, international relations, or innovation and the arts. This standard for the 
acquisition of nationality by immigrants and their descendants is not necessarily related 
to a country’s other modes for the acquisition of nationality based on special effective links 
with the country. 
6. proCEdurEs for ThE ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy
The following provisions are respected by national authorities and monitored by the Na-
tional Ombudsman:
6.2. A PUBLIC SERVICE WELCOMING CITIZENS-TO-BE
6.2.1. Authorities inform foreigners about the naturalisation requirements, procedure and 
benefits through free information services, websites and materials. The state supports an 
optional service to check if the application and documentation is complete.
6.2.2. In addition, authorities promote naturalisation among foreigners and the general 
public.
6.2.3. Applicants have multiple ways to send in their application both directly to the decid-
ing authority and indirectly through several types of local services. 
Since naturalisation involves various legal eligibility criteria and requirements, the pro-
cedure must guarantee the proper implementation of the law and equal treatment of all 
applicants. Looking only at the legal requirements does not indicate which or how many 
obstacles exist in the naturalisation procedure. For ordinary applicants for naturalisation, 
obstacles in law and in practice arise in equal measure in most European countries. The 
ways that laws are implemented can lead to significant variation in naturalisation rates be-
tween groups of applicants and over time. The differences in local implementation within 
the same country may be significant. 
The public administration properly implements the law by facilitating procedures that 
welcome immigrants as citizens-to-be. With this approach, the public administration rec-
ognises that these applicants are potential future citizens. The administration ought to 
inform immigrants and the public of the legal requirements for naturalisation, accept all 
applicants who meet these requirements and provide information and assistance to those 
who do not currently meet them.
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All citizens benefit from information on the advantages of citizenship and the naturalisa-
tion procedure. A lack of information and public encouragement are two reasons why 
eligible foreigners do not naturalise; they do not know or do not feel that they are welcome 
as new citizens. A lack of information and public encouragement also perpetuates myths 
in the public about the naturalisation policy and stirs anti-immigrant sentiment, which 
constrains policy-making and good governance. 
A nationwide naturalisation campaign would assist and encourage immigrants to apply, 
while informing the public about the benefits of naturalisation. State promotional meas-
ures help eligible foreigners to apply for naturalisation. The government can support free 
preparatory classes and information sessions. Free and accessible services counsel and 
inform applicants about their eligibility for naturalisation. They also distribute applica-
tions, double-check and receive them. Online and written material can be provided in the 
form of websites, leaflets, brochures and pamphlets. Strong promotional measures may 
improve public awareness and support for the policy, raise application rates and lower 
rejection rates, depending on how restrictive are the country’s legal requirements.
6. proCEdurEs for ThE ACquIsITIon of nATIonALITy
6.2.4. One specialised nationality unit examines the application, checks that all documen-
tation is correct and makes the final decision. 
6.2.5. Authorities check each requirement on the basis of the required documentation and 
their publically available interpretative guidelines. The state eliminates the discretion of 
authorities as far as possible in order to guarantee that naturalisation is a legal entitlement 
for all persons who meet the legal requirements. 
6.2.6. Applicants have the right to be informed on the progress of the procedure. 
6.2.7. Authorities shall give written notification of the decision as soon as possible and in 
any event no later than six months from the date on which the application was lodged. The 
time limit may be extended in exceptional circumstances linked to the complexity of the 
examination of the application. If no decision is taken by the end of this period, the applica-
tion has been tacitly approved.
Dedicated public administrations with professional service standards are established for 
important routine services for the public. In the past, the acquisition of citizenship has 
often required a discretionary decision by the executive (such as the President or King), 
the Legislature, or a Minister. Such an ‘exceptional’ procedure no longer functions in 
most countries of immigration. Naturalisation is a normal part of the integration pro-
cess. Every year, thousands of people are acquiring their citizenship and thousands more 
are eligible for citizenship. In countries of immigration, the acquisition of citizenship 
qualifies as a regular important service that deserves a dedicated and professional public 
administration. 
A specialised and highly-trained unit can receive applications, check documentation, 
access related data from other services and make the final decision. Responsibility for 
naturalisation makes most sense within the authority responsible for justice and citizens’ 
rights. Any related assessment is best made by expert bodies (e.g. state security servic-
es, language and education professionals, judges). In decentralised procedures, national 
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authorities should review decisions made by similar units at local or regional level. In 
all cases, authorities must follow national guidelines that are clear, detailed, binding and 
available to the public. These good governance guidelines ensure that naturalisation deci-
sions are based on the law. 
Time limits for processing the application serve as a benchmark for administrative prac-
tice and a guarantee for applicants. Article 10 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Nationality states that processing must be completed in a reasonable time. Legal time lim-
its are commonly used for processing similar applications, such as for immigration, asy-
lum and residence. The use of legal time limits encourages the administration to devote 
sufficient human and financial resources in order to avoid backlogs. Authorities can also 
easily keep applicants up-to-date on the progress of their application. 
Reducing the bureaucracy encourages applicants, makes it easier for authorities them-
selves to come to a decision and reduces the variation in processing times and naturalisa-
tion rates across the country. Most importantly, reducing the bureaucracy helps ensure 
that authorities do not reject people who actually meet the legal requirements. The bigger 
the bureaucracy is, the more authorities are involved, the more complicated becomes the 
documentation, the greater is the risk of discretion and the greater is the risk of error in the 
procedures, misinterpretation of the requirements and duplication of decision-making.
6.3. PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES
6.3.1. Reasons shall be given for any decision rejecting an application. The notification shall 
specify the specific ground(s) of rejection, specific reasons and evidence for each ground, 
the review and appeal procedures available and the time within which the applicant may 
request a review or lodge an appeal.
6.3.2. Applicants have the right to an administrative review and an independent judicial 
appeal. The review and appeal can cover both the decision to reject the application as well 
as any assessment required for naturalisation. Appellants have equal access to the legal aid 
provided in the country for general appeal procedures.
6.3.3. National courts have the power to examine both procedural and substantive aspects 
and change the decision in merit. 
Judicial review is an option in most normal administrative procedures based on checks 
and balances through the separation of powers. These provisions are also spelled out in 
Articles 11 and 12 of the Council of Europe’s Convention on Nationality. The right to a rea-
soned decision requires that rejections of applications stick to the requirements in the law 
and stand on solid evidence. Legal and factual reasons must be given in all cases. With this 
greater transparency of the decision, applicants will better understand and trust the deci-
sion and avoid unsuccessful appeals or re-applications. If rejected applicants do believe 
that they meet the legal requirements, the right to administrative review and an independ-
ent judicial appeal strengthens the rule of law, non-discrimination and equal treatment of 
all applicants. The judge can clarify what is the proper and uniform interpretation of the 
law and what are the proper roles of the authorities in the procedure.
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6.4. EQUAL TREATMENT AND RECOGNITION OF NEW CITIZENS
6.4.1. Authorities guarantee the equal treatment of all applicants within the procedure 
across the national territory. 
6.4.2. The procedure does not contain distinctions or include any practice which amounts 
to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour, national or ethnic origin, 
nationality, age, disability, or sexual orientation. Respect of this provision is monitored by 
the national equality agency.
6.4.3. Authorities solemnly recognise the conferral of nationality upon naturalised citizens 
through whatever means are appropriate in the country.
6.4.4. Authorities facilitate as much as possible the registration of new citizen voters and any 
of other new civic responsibilities conferred by national and EU citizenship.
The equal treatment of all applicants is established through the conditional right to ordinary 
naturalisation. Eliminating administrative discretion means that the state promises to natu-
ralise applicants based on the law. No foreigner will make it through the ordinary naturali-
sation procedure without meeting its clear legal requirements. In return, anyone who meets 
these requirements is guaranteed to be welcomed as a citizen. Clear commitments to equal 
treatment and non-discrimination in the citizenship law encourage their respect by imple-
menting authorities. All EU Member States, as signatories to the International Convention 
for the Elimination of all Forms of Racism (1965), agree in Article 1, paragraph 3, that their 
citizenship laws will not discriminate against any particular nationality. Article 5, paragraph 
1 of the 1997 Council of Europe Convention on Nationality also prohibits any distinctions 
or any practice amounting to discrimination on the grounds of sex, religion, race, colour or 
national or ethnic origin. Paragraph 2 of the same Article furthermore prohibits discrimina-
tion between citizens by birth and by naturalisation. Age, disability and sexual orientation 
are three further protected grounds under the Article 19 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. Such commitments in nationality law introduce the necessary level 
of scrutiny requiring objective and proportionate justifications of any decision of rejection. 
Naturalisation ceremonies can promote the equal treatment of successful applicants as full 
and equal citizens. This promotional measure has spread across Europe, following in the 
footsteps of the traditional countries of immigration, such as Canada and the United States, 
where naturalisation is a tool to promote integration. Traditionally in Europe, the actual 
act of conferring citizenship has been a low-level bureaucratic affair, involving the delivery 
of national citizenship documents. Ceremonies in municipalities infuse the acquisition of 
citizenship with diverse local colours and meanings that are closer to the realities of im-
migrants and the public. These ceremonies can draw on symbols from the country’s his-
tory of democracy and make parallels with other civic ceremonies, such as those for young 
people getting the right to vote. Ceremonies may involve public dignitaries and the media 
in order to raise public awareness. Their participation turns ceremonies into a platform for 
awareness-raising and, specifically, giving voice to new citizens. Stakeholders working on 
integration and active citizenship can use ceremonies as rallying points to recruit new vol-
unteers or register new voters. 
Active citizenship concerns how individuals can participate in civil society, community and 
political life. Volunteer and civic organisations engage new and old citizens as equals in con-
crete daily situations that help shape future citizenship policies and identity debates. Active 
citizenship initiatives and intercultural and citizenship education in compulsory education 
encourage the exercise of the rights and responsibilities that come with the acquisition of 
nationality, which fosters a shared sense of belonging in a diverse society.
About Eudo-CITIzEnshIp
Democracy is government accountable to citizens. But 
how do states determine who their citizens are? EUDO 
CITIZENSHIP allows you to answer this and many other 
questions on citizenship in the EU member states and 
neighbouring countries.
EUDO CITIZENSHIP is an observatory within the 
European Union Observatory on Democracy (EUDO) 
web platform hosted at the Robert Schuman Centre for 
Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in 
Florence.
The observatory conducts research and provides exhaus-
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citizenship, national and international legal norms, citi-
zenship statistics, bibliographical resources, comparative 
analyses and debates about research strategies and policy 
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All results of the project are accessible on the EUDO 
CITIZENSHIP observatory at www.eudo-citizenship.eu
C
IT
IZ
E
N
S
H
IP
IN
S
T
IT
U
T
IO
N
S
About the mIGrATIon poLICy Group
The Migration Policy Group is an independent non-profit 
European organisation dedicated to strategic thinking and 
acting on mobility, equality, and diversity. MPG’s mission 
is to contribute to lasting and positive change resulting in 
open and inclusive societies by stimulating well-informed 
European debate and action on migration, equality and 
diversity, and enhancing European co-operation between 
and amongst governmental agencies, civil society organi-
sations and the private sector. 
We articulate this mission through four primary activities 
focused on harnessing the advantages of migration, equal-
ity and diversity and responding effectively to their chal-
lenges:
Gathering, analysing and sharing information
Creating opportunities for dialogue and mutual learning
Mobilising and engaging stakeholders in policy debates
Establishing, inspiring and managing expert networks
For more information on our past and current research, 
visit our website at www.migpolgroup.com
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